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I. Introduction 
 
A 2018 Report for the European Parliament’s Committee on 
International Trade concluded: 
 
Corruption perception indexes [show] that in most of the 
world corruption is the rule rather than the exception.  The report 
finds evidence that international trade agreements have the 
potential to act as the exogenous factor breaking the vicious circle 
of corruption in economies based on privileged connections rather 
than fair competition.…1 
 
The European Commission reported that corruption costs the EU at 
least €120bn per annum—almost as much as the EU’s annual budget, and a 
 
 1. Alina Mungui-Pippidi, Anti-Corruption Provisions in EU Free Trade and Investment 
Agreements: Delivering on Clean, EUR. PARL. DOC. 10.2861/203713 at 5 (Apr. 2018), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/603867/EXPO_STU(2018)603
867_EN.pdf (“They increase competition in the removal of tariffs and so diminish the power 
of rentier companies which influence domestic regulation in their favor. They also contribute 
to a fairer business environment through their transparency provisions.”). See also Alina 
Mungui-Pippidi, Fostering Good Governance through Trade Agreements, EUR. RES. CTR. 
FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION AND STATE-BUILDING (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.againstcorrup 
tion.eu/events/anti-corruption-provisions-in-eu-free-trade-and-investment-agreements-deliv 
ering-on-clean-trade/ (The options offered are between good governance package, a firm 
anticorruption language but unenforceable provisions even in EU countries.). 
3 - Brown_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delete) 4/24/2020  2:05 PM 
Summer 2020] EU-China FTA 213 
2016 study commissioned by the European Parliament found the cost of 
corruption across every EU member state could actually be as high as €990 
billion—eight times higher than previous estimates.2  
Clearly, corruption hurts competition, raises prices, negates fair trade, 
and has social consequences;3 it is one of the most pervasive and financially 
damaging crimes in the world, costing the global economy an estimated $2.6 
trillion every year, or 5 percent of the world’s gross domestic product.4  
In China, a 2018 report concludes a partial accounting of corruption 
showed Chinese-listed firms suffered an aggregate loss of USD $30 billion 
in firm value due to corruption.5 Chinese President Xi Jinping has called 
“corruption, the ruling Communist Party’s biggest threat and vowed a 
‘sweeping victory ’over the problem.”6  
The widespread corruption involved in Chinese (often state-owned) 
companies ’overseas activities has become a growing international problem. 
In the latest BPI [Business Performance Indicator], China ranked 27 out of 
 
 2. Ruth Green, Fighting Corruption Remains a Low Priority for the EU, INT’L BAR 
ASS’N (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=8ab99 
96b-5454-4a7d-a38a-6e376aa310f3. See generally Costs of Corruption Across the EU, THE 
GREENS/EFA IN THE EUR. PARL. (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.greens-efa.eu/files/doc/docs/e 
46449daadbfebc325a0b408bbf5ab1d.pdf. (“At a national level, the damage done by 
corruption to the GDP of EU Member States ranges from 15% in Romania (€38.6 billion) to 
0.76% in the Netherlands (still adding up however to over €4.4 billion). Italy breaks the record 
in absolute terms, losing €236.8 billion each year to corruption. France comes second, losing 
€120.2 billion each year to corruption, whilst Germany takes a hit to GDP of over €104 billion 
every single year.”). Of course, all bribery does not involve cross-border transactions; rather 
it is a reminder of the pervasiveness of corruption. 
 3. Elvin Mirzayev, How Corruption Affects Emerging Economies, INVESTOPEDIA (May 
19, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/012215/how-corruption-affects-
emerging-economies.asp.   
 4. U.N. Security Council, Global Cost of Corruption at Least 5 Per Cent of World Gross 
Domestic Product, Secretary-General Tells Security Council, Citing World Economic Forum 
Data (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13493.doc.htm.  
 5. Daniel S. Kim, Yun Li & Domenico Tarzia, Value of Corruption in China: Evidence 
from Anti-Corruption Investigation, ELSEVIER: ECON. LETTERS (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www. 
sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176518300296?via%3Dihub; https://doi.org/10. 
1016/j.econlet.2018.01.021. See also China Corruption Rank, TRADING ECON., https:// 
tradingeconomics.com/china/corruption-rank (China is the 87th least corrupt nation out of 
175 countries, according to the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index.). Ralph Jennings, Bad for 
Business? China’s Corruption Isn’t Getting Any Better Despite Government Crackdown, 
FORBES (Mar. 15, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2018/03/ 
15/corruption-in-china-gets-stuck-half-way-between-the-worlds-best-and-worst/#720e34c6 
73d1 (Some experts observe, foreign companies prefer to operate in China’s 14 special trade 
zones “because they’re relatively free of corruption.”).   
 6. Jennings, Bad for Business? China’s Corruption Isn’t Getting Any Better Despite 
Government Crackdown, supra note 5.   
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28 major global economies, with only Russian companies being even more 
likely to pay bribes abroad.7  
On the global level, in the last two decades Regional Free Trade 
Agreements (RTAs) have attempted to curb corruption through treaty 
provisions. … corruption was identified as a major hindrance to free trade 
and a vast enterprise was begun to build a legal framework against 
international anticorruption. Its target is both national corruption––abuse of 
authority for private benefit, as it is defined by most international 
organizations––and international corruption, focusing in particular on 
transnational bribery.8 … That then led to the common tendency of modern 
RTAs to address regulatory areas such as transparency and anticorruption 
provisions alongside environmental and labor standards with more than 40 
per cent of RTAs concluded since the millennium incorporating 
anticorruption and anti-bribery commitments, which have no precedent 
under the WTO regime.9  
This paper discusses the domestic and international standards and 
regulation of corruption and assesses whether an EU-China FTA with 
anticorruption and transparency provisions on trade and investment can 
facilitate a diminishing of the corruption. Specifically, it examines the 
anticorruption standards at the international level (OECD; UN; WTO; EU’s 
GRECO), and at the domestic level with China, EU, and selected EU 
member states, with some reference to the FCPA of the U.S. Issues include 
how corruption is defined, whether private and public persons are covered, 
whether there is an extra-territorial reach of domestic laws, what is the 
administrative enforcement, what are the penalties: civil and/or criminal, and 
what is the effectiveness of such regulatory measures? It will then compare 
 
 7. Bertram Lang, China and Global Integrity-Building: Challenges and Prospects for 
Engagement, U4 ANTI-CORRUPTION RESOURCE CTR. at 3 (2019), https://www.u4.no/publi 
cations/china-and-global-integrity-building-challenges-and-prospects-for-engagement.pdf. 
See also Nieves Zúñiga, China: Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption, 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Apr. 10, 2018), https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads 
/helpdesk/Country-profile-China-2018.pdf (“According to a survey conducted by Charney 
Research in 2015, 35 per cent of companies in China confirmed that they had to pay bribes or 
give gifts to officials to operate … [and] corruption at the border in China is one of the most 
problematic factors for importers …. Respondents to the Executive Opinion Survey 2017 
(World Economic Forum 2017) situate corruption as the fourth most problematic factor for 
doing business in China after access to financing, inefficient government bureaucracy, 
inflation and policy instability.”).  
 8. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1.  
 9. Id. at 16-17. See also Matthew Jenkins, Anti-Corruption and Transparency Provisions in 
Trade Agreements, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.transparency.org/ 
files/content/corruptionqas/Anti-corruption_and_transparency_provisions_in_trade_agreem 
ents_2017.pdf.  
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and assess how EU-China FTA provisions could enhance the enforcement 
of anticorruption regulation where domestic laws are inadequate.  
 
II. Corruption and Assessment of Remedial Effectiveness 
 
Corruption Defined 
 
There is no single globally accepted definition of corruption. 
Transparency International, the leading international NGO seeking to curb 
corruption, defines it as “the abuse of entrusted power for personal gain. The 
main forms of corruption are bribery, embezzlement, fraud and extortion.”10 
It can arise either as active bribery (the act of promising or giving the bribe), 
as opposed to the act of receiving a bribe (passive bribery).11 It can 
encompass domestic bribery (private to public and public to private); 
corruption of foreign officials (international); facilitation payments; 
compliance programs; jurisdictional issues to prosecute corruption; 
exemptions; and remedies.12 
Rampant: Globally and with EU and China  
 
There seems to be no country free of corruption in trade.13 The U.S. 
anticorruption law, the FCPA, shows its top enforcement actions may come 
from the “cleanest” countries doing business in corrupt ones.14 
 
 10. Corruption Dictionary, GAN BUS. ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL, https://www.ganinte 
grity.com/portal/corruption-dictionary/. See also What is Corruption?, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption#define.  
 11. Glossary, U4 ANTI-CORRUPTION RESOURCE CTR., https://www.u4.no/terms. 
 12. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1, at 10 (“Typical examples of corruption encountered 
by foreigners are the solicitation of bribes to obtain foreign exchange, import, export, 
investment or production licenses or to avoid paying tax, although for international investors 
that sort of extortion amounts to an extra tax.”).   
 13. Index of Pub. Integrity, https://integrity-index.org. See Alina Mungui-Pippidi, 
Fostering Good Governance Through Trade Agreements: An evidence-based review for the 
workshop ‘EU anticorruption chapters in EU free trade and investment agreements’, EUR. 
RES. CTR FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION AND STATE-BUILDING at 5 (Jan. 24, 2018), http://www.ro 
maniacurata.ro/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/INTA-CORRUPTION-SEMINAR-AMP-SLID 
ES-FOR-POSTING.pdf.  
 14. Lisa Thompson, A new No. 1: Petrobras agrees to biggest FCPA settlement, 
BIZBLOG (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.lexisnexis.com/communities/lexisnexis_biz/b/bizblog/ 
archive/2018/10/05/a-new-no-1-petrobras-agrees-to-biggest-fcpa-settlement.aspx (The top 
ten FCPA settlements involved: 1. Brazil; 2. Sweden; 3. Germany; 4. Netherlands; 5 and 6. 
France; 7 and 8. U.S.; 9. Israel). 
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Corruption remains endemic, and government leaders have failed to 
make fundamental reforms.15  
What is missing is active enforcement. Transparency International’s 
new report, Exporting Corruption, finds that only 11 major exporting 
countries—accounting for about a third of world exports—have active or 
moderate law enforcement against companies bribing abroad in order to gain 
mining rights, contracts for major construction projects, purchases of planes 
and other deals.16  
 
Regulatory Approaches Affecting EU and China 
 
There are a variety of regulatory approaches used to combat corruption, 
including: explicitly prohibiting corruption (criminal and civil), requiring 
transactional transparency, good government (government integrity) by 
international standards, self-standing conventions implemented by the 
members, and free trade agreement provisions. 
 
International Standards of Organizations and Conventions   
 
While Global standards are often merely aspirational, they promote and 
occasionally require action by their terms. China is covered by WBO and 
UN “obligations” and the EU is covered by those and also OECD and EU 
conventions, discussed below. 
 
WTO and Anticorruption 
 
There are no explicit provisions in WTO treaties that prohibit 
corruption in trade, rather they rely on nondiscrimination and transparency 
requirements.17 Besides tariffs, the elimination of quantitative, and other 
non-tariff barriers to trade, there are a number of corruption deterrence 
instruments in three treaties regulating the procedures governing certain 
stages or types of trade, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 
1994), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and to a lesser 
 
 15. Mungiu-Pippidi, Fostering Good Governance Through Trade Agreements: An 
evidence-based review for the workshop ‘EU anticorruption chapters in EU free trade and 
investment agreements’, supra note 13. 
 16. Id. See also China, 2019 INDEX OF ECON. FREEDOM, https://www.heritage.org/ 
index/country/china.  
 17. Padideh Ala’I, The WTO and the Anti-Corruption Movement, 6 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L 
L. REV. 259, 259-278 (2008), https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1060&context=facsch_lawrev. 
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extent in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS Agreement).  
All those agreements aim to reduce administrative discretion and, under 
the rubric of ‘transparency, ’to provide for members to ensure that their 
responsible officials will be unable to hide behind secretive processes to 
grant government contracts or licenses on the basis of particularistic 
considerations, whether protectionist or corrupt.18  
There are additional WTO provisions which serve to deter corruption, 
for example, the Government Procurement Act (GPA)19 and the Trade 
Facilitation Agreement.20  
GPA asks all participating countries to open up their markets and 
establish independent “domestic review systems”  which means mechanisms 
to review complaints to which both foreign and domestic suppliers may 
apply for correction of procedural errors. GPA also establishes additional 
external oversight by making national procurement systems subject to 
scrutiny by the WTO Committee on Government Procurement, and through 
the WTO’s binding dispute settlement system.21 
 
 18. Mungui-Pippidi, Fostering Good Governance through Trade Agreements, supra 
note 1, at 18 (“Recently the introduction of a monitoring mechanism was proposed and 
innovative proposals on e-procurement are included.”). 
 19. Id. at 17. See GATT 1994: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Art. X:1, Art. X:2, 
Art. X:3(a), Art. X:3(b), 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, (1994); see also GATS: General Agreement on 
Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1B, Art. III:1, Art. VI:1, Art. VI:2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 (1994); and see 
TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Art. 41:4, Art. 
63:1, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994). 
 20. The Trade Facilitation Agreement, World Trade Organization, https://www.tfa 
facility.org/trade-facilitation-agreement-facility (“Traders from both developing and 
developed countries have long pointed to the vast amount of ‘red tape’ that still exists in 
moving goods across borders, and … [the] TFA contains provisions for expediting the 
movement, release and clearance of goods, including goods in transit.… The Agreement will 
help improve transparency, increase possibilities to participate in global value chains, and 
reduce the scope for corruption.”). 
 21. Mungui-Pippidi, Fostering Good Governance through Trade Agreements, supra 
note 1, at 17-18 (The Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) is the most direct 
instrument to counter corruption among WTO Member governments. A multilateral treaty, 
the GPA applies only to those Members which have accepted its provisions … “The Preamble 
to the GPA sets out the three main goals of the parties regarding procurement. First, GPA 
opens the market for government purchases to suppliers from all party territories. A second, 
related goal of the GPA is non-discrimination in the procurement process. The parties 
‘recognize ’that government procurement laws should not and should not aim to discriminate 
in favor of national suppliers nor to the advantage of one country’s suppliers over those of 
another. The third goal of the Government Procurement Agreement is to enhance the 
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United Nations 
 
There are two UN conventions relevant to the global fight against 
corruption. The first is the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(UNCAC).22 It is the only legally binding, universal anticorruption 
instrument.23 The actual implementation of the Convention into domestic 
law by States is evaluated through a peer-review process, the Implementation 
Review Mechanism, where assistance is provided to identify deficiencies in 
a country’s regulatory process, but there is no direct enforcement 
mechanism.24  
The second convention is the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto (UNCTOC).25  
This is the main international instrument in the fight against transnational 
organized crime and includes protocols against human trafficking, 
smuggling migrants, and illicit manufacturing and trafficking in firearms.26  
 
OECD27 
 
The OECD was founded in 1961 to stimulate economic progress and 
world trade. In 1999, its AntiBribery Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions came into 
force that requires its signatories to criminalize the bribery of foreign public 
officials in international business transactions.28 Its global track record of 
 
‘transparency of laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding government 
procurement’ and to provide for ‘fair’ procedures to ensure that the rules on procurement are 
effective.”). 
 22. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41.  
 23. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 22. (“The Convention 
covers five main areas: preventive measures, criminalization and law enforcement, 
international cooperation, asset recovery, and technical assistance and information exchange. 
The Convention covers many different forms of corruption, such as bribery, trading in 
influence, abuse of functions, and various acts of corruption in the private sector.”).  
 24. Implementation Review Mechanism, UNODC, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ 
corruption/implementation-review-mechanism.html. 
 25. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 
2225 U.N.T.S. 209.   
 26. Id.  
 27. Where: Global Reach, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-partners/ 
(The 36 OECD countries have adopted this Convention.).  
 28. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions and Related Documents, Dec. 17, 1997, OECD.   
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enforcement is annually updated.29 A monitoring mechanism exists, based 
on peer-review; but the OECD has no sanctions itself within its authority. 
 
Group of States Against Corruption 
 
The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)30  was established in 
1999 by the Council of Europe to monitor State compliance with the 
organization’s anticorruption standards.31 Its members include countries 
outside Europe and its objective is to improve the capacity of its members to 
fight corruption by monitoring their compliance with its anticorruption 
standards through a process of mutual evaluation and peer pressure.  
In sum, the two UN conventions and GRECO all address matters of 
corruption control with the focus on procedures. Countries are directed to 
create anticorruption agencies and adopt legislation. The OECD focuses 
more on enforcement; but like the others, it too is based on peer review and 
lacks sanctions  
 
European Union 
 
 29. OECD Working Group on Bribery, 2017 Enforcement of the Anti-Bribery 
Convention, OECD at 1 (Nov. 2018), https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/OECD-WGB-
Enforcement-Data-2018-ENG.pdf (Highlights from the 2017 data. Three countries adopted 
law reforms designed to support more effective anti-bribery law enforcement. Reforms 
include the lengthening the statute of limitations (Italy), creating corporate liability for 
corruption (Argentina) and reinforcing laws on anti-money laundering laws and confiscation 
of the proceeds of foreign bribery (Japan). Three Parties joined the list of jurisdictions that 
are known to have sanctioned foreign bribery: Brazil, Spain and Australia. This brings to 23 
the total number of Parties to the Convention that have sanctioned foreign bribery at least 
once, but it also means that 21 Parties have never sanctioned foreign bribery.).  
 30. Members and Observers/Etats Membres et Observateurs, COUNCIL OF EUR., https:// 
www.coe.int/en/web/greco/structure/member-and-observers (Currently, GRECO comprises 
49 member States (48 European States and the United States of America.). 
 31. GRECO, What is GRECO?, https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/about-greco/what-is-
greco. (“It helps to identify deficiencies in national anti-corruption policies, prompting the 
necessary legislative, institutional and practical reforms. GRECO also provides a platform for 
the sharing of best practice in the prevention and detection of corruption. GRECO. 
Membership in GRECO, which is an enlarged agreement, is not limited to Council of Europe 
member States. Moreover, any State which becomes Party to the Criminal or Civil Law 
Conventions on Corruption automatically accedes to GRECO and its evaluation procedures. 
Legal instruments adopted by the Council of Europe: Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption (ETS 173), Civil Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 174). Additional Protocol 
to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 191), Twenty Guiding Principles against 
Corruption (Resolution (97) 24), Recommendation on Codes of Conduct for Public Officials 
(Recommendation No. R(2000)10), Recommendation on Common Rules against Corruption 
in the Funding of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns (Recommendation 
Rec(2003)4).”). 
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The EU Convention Against Corruption Involving Officials became 
effective in 1997 to fight corruption involving European officials or national 
officials of Member States of the European Union (EU).32 Members are 
required to take measures to ensure that passive or active corruption by 
officials is a punishable criminal offense and that the laws include 
jurisdiction.33  
Perhaps the anticorruption standards with the most substantial global 
impact is the Federal Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of the U.S.34   
The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977 is the first 
major piece of national legislation aimed at combating bribery and the first 
to introduce corporate liability, responsibility for third parties and extra-
territoriality for corruption offenses. Prohibition of bribery payments is 
limited to foreign officials, and the FCPA includes a limited exception for 
facilitation payments. With nearly global jurisdiction, the FCPA is widely 
enforced, and the current trend points towards increased enforcement 
actions, fines and imprisonment.35  
Its jurisdictional presence is felt around the world and its recent practice 
of seeking claims on behalf of other countries promises more cooperation in 
the future.36 Its anticorruption approach is two-fold: One that addresses 
accounting transparency requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 and another concerning bribery of foreign officials. The law has 
penalties, civil and criminal, and a track record of successes in prosecution.37   
 
 32. Convention Drawn Up on the Basis of Article K.3 (2) (c) of the Treaty on European 
Union on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities or 
Officials of Member States of the European Union, June 25, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 195) 2. 
 33. Id. (Jurisdiction must cover the following cases. “… when the offence is committed 
in whole or in part within its territory; when the offender is one of its nationals or one of its 
officials; when the offence is committed against European or national officials or against a 
member of the EU institutions who is also one of its nationals; when the offender is a 
European official working for a European Community institution, agency or body that has its 
headquarters in the Member State in question.”). 
 34. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (2004).  
 35. FCPA Compliance Guide, Compliance Guides, GAN BUS. ANTI-CORRUPTION 
PORTAL, https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/compliance-quick-guides/united-states/.   
 36. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1, at 25.  
 37. Identify FCPA Foreign Corruption Anti-Bribery Risks and Prevent Violations, 
Regulations, VISUAL OFAC, https://www.visualofac.com/regulations/fcpa-violations-
penalties/ (Civil and criminal penalties for FCPA Anti-bribery and Books and Records 
violations are significant.). See also Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Fraud Section 
Home, THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt-
practices-act. 
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Another evolving alternative to government enforcement in the U.S. is 
the individual filing of derivative lawsuits through which shareholders can 
sue a company’s directors and officers for breaching their fiduciary duties to 
that company.38 
 
Free Trade Agreements ’Anticorruption Provisions  
 
International trade agreements are reported to help in the control of 
corruption in two ways: “by increasing competition directly, due to removal 
of tariffs thereby diminishing the power of rentier companies which 
influence regulation in their favor and by contributing to a fairer business 
environment through transparency provisions.”39  
 
… the expansion of trade across the most diverse governance 
regimes has meant that non-tariff measures (NTMs) began to 
weigh considerably, so needing an approach to achieve a degree 
of regulatory coherence across jurisdictions. That then led to the 
common tendency of modern RTAs to address regulatory areas 
such as transparency and anti-corruption provisions.…40 
 
This need for regional coherency has led to nearly half of the RTAs 
incorporating anticorruption and antibribery commitments.41 
The provisions come in different forms; for example, anticorruption, 
transparency, and good government (government integrity) provisions that 
 
 38. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1, at 26 (“For instance, in In Re Petrobras Securities 
Litigation a group of shareholders allege that Petrobras issued ‘materially false and 
misleading’ financial statements and ‘false and misleading statements regarding the integrity 
of its management and the effectiveness of its financial control.”). 
 39. Id. at 16 (“For over half a century non-discrimination and transparency have been 
basic principles of agreements governing world trade, with the goal of ensuring a level playing 
field for foreign businesses…. Dedicated anti-corruption provisions are of more recent date, 
although their goal of equal treatment of businesses regardless of country of origin remains 
the same.”). 
 40. Id. at 16-17. See also Jenkins, Anti-Corruption and Transparency Provisions in 
Trade Agreements, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Feb. 6, 2017), supra note 9. Stefan Mbiyavanga, 
Improving domestic governance through international investment law: Should bilateral 
investment treaties learn from international anti-corruption conventions?, 2017 OED GLOBAL 
ANTI-CORRUPTION & INTEGRITY FORUM (Mar. 31, 2017), http://iffoadatabase.trustafrica.org/ 
iff/Integrity-Forum-2017-Mbiyavanga-international-investment-law.pdf. 
 41. Mungui-Pippidi, Fostering Good Governance through Trade Agreements, supra 
note 1, at 17. 
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aim to keep transactions open and thus more likely to be non-corrupt.42 A 
“model” anti-bribery clause has been suggested, modeled after OECD 
obligations.43 Some trade agreements like the CPTPP and the EU-Canada 
CETA provide protections that allow investors to seek restitution outside the 
host state’s judicial system through an arbitration tribunal, where that state 
has not complied with its treaty obligations.   
However, it has been noted, what happens if a country lacks the “proper 
institutions for the desired implementation; for instance, judicial 
independence? Mechanisms might exist in trade agreements but have no 
impact if further development of enforcement structures is not pursued.”44 
As reforms may proceed, international arbitration is increasingly used to 
provide remedies. Over time, investor-state arbitration has proved to be an 
emerging space for enforcement of international norms—including 
transparency and anticorruption.45  
 
Regulatory Variables  
 
The relevant laws and their effectiveness will be assessed based on the 
following variables.46   
III. Legal 
International Obligations and Sanctions   
 
International standards and conventions, such as from WBO, UN, 
OECD, OECD Anti-Corruption Convention,47 GRECO, and the EU 
 
 42. Augusto Lopez-Claros, Six Strategies to Fight Corruption, WORLD BANK BLOGS, 
https://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01605/WEB/2042.HTM. 
 43. Mbiyavanga, supra note 40. 
 44. Mungui-Pippidi, Fostering Good Governance through Trade Agreements, supra 
note 1, at 25. See also Matt Reeder, State Corruption in ICSID BIT Arbitration: Can it be 
Estopped?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Mar. 9, 2017), http://arbitrationblog.kluwer 
arbitration.com/2017/03/09/state-corruption-in-icsid-bit-arbitration/, for a discussion on the 
use of corruption as a bar to arbitration. 
 45. Mungui-Pippidi, Fostering Good Governance through Trade Agreements, supra 
note 1, at 25. 
 46. Not assessed is the relevant status of individual country’s rule of law—which is 
indispensable to effective enforcement of the laws at the domestic level. 
 47. OECD, Ratification Status as of May 2018, OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING 
BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUB. OFFICIALS IN INT’L BUS. TRANSACTIONS (May 2018), https:// 
www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGBRatificationStatus.pdf (The states ratifying the OECD 
Anti-Corruption Convention include Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, 
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Convention Against Corruption Involving Officials, require a state’s 
commitment to its legislative obligations and having enforcement provisions 
in place.48 The EU, selected EU Members,49 and China50 have agreed to 
adhere to the following: 
 
  WTO  UN  OECD  OECD 
Anticorruption  
Convention  
GRECO  EU 
AntiCorruption  
Convention  
Involving  
Officials  
EU  X  X          
 
Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian 
Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States of America. OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
Ratification Status as of May 2017.) 
 48. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 22 (EU and China are 
parties in in WTO and both UN instruments.). United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 25. Where: Global Reach, supra note 27 (But 
they are not members of OECD or GRECO.). Members and Observers/Etats Membres et 
Observateurs, supra note 30. OECD, Implementation of the Anti-Corruption Action Plan, 
ADB/OECD ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVE, https://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-corrup 
tioninitiative/implementationoftheanti-corruptionactionplan.htm (China has endorsed the 
ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific Plan. Though it has no enforcement 
mechanism, it does provide for possible technical support and advising. Implementation of 
the Anti-Corruption Action Plan. “By endorsing the Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Asia-
Pacific, the Initiative’s member countries have committed to undertake meaningful reform to 
bolster their safeguards against corruption. Under the Action Plan’s implementation 
mechanism, countries have committed to “endeavor, in consultation with the Secretariat of 
the Initiative, to identify priority reform areas which would fall under any of the three pillars 
and aim to implement these in a workable timeframe.”).  
 49. UK, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and Netherlands. 
 50. Gillian Dell & Andrew McDevitt,  Exporting Corruption – Progress Report 2018: 
Assessing Enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, TRANSPARENCY INT’L at 23 
(October 2018), https://www.transparency.org/files/content/publication/Download_a_short_ 
version_of_the_report.pdf (“In 2014-2017, China’s average share of world exports of goods 
and services was 10.8 per cent, compared with the United States’ 9.9 per cent. As the world’s 
leading exporter, China has a special responsibility with respect to the practices of its 
companies and business people abroad, as they have a significant impact on trade practices. 
China’s performance regarding international anticorruption standards influences attitudes and 
behavior in other major exporting countries. Likewise, other major exporters such as Hong 
Kong, India and Singapore, covered in this report but not to date party to the OECD 
Convention, have a responsibility to contribute to tackling corruption in the supply side of 
international trade.”)   
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Selected EU   X  X  X  X  X   X  
China  X  X          
 
The primary role of these international organizations is to gain the 
domestic adoption of the standards and the monitoring thereafter with actual 
enforcement left to each state.51 The shortcoming of the above “obligations” 
is that the method of their implementation and ultimate enforcement are left 
to the states and their domestic laws. “Monitoring mechanisms and collective 
sanctions are mentioned as enforcement means, but seldom implemented. 
Relying on peer-review evaluations the UN conventions, GRECO and the 
OECD completely lack any sanctions mechanism.”52 
On the other hand, though the OECD, itself, has no sanctions within its 
authority, its Anti-Bribery Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions has had some impact 
and success.53 Its global track record of enforcement/implementation by the 
signatories is annually updated, with the latest 2017 figures below. The 
Convention has a monitoring mechanism, based on peer-review; 560 
individuals and 184 entities have received criminal sanctions for foreign 
bribery between the time the Convention entered into force in 1999 and the 
end of 2017.  
At least 125 of the sanctioned individuals have been sentenced to prison 
for foreign bribery, including at least 11 for prison terms exceeding 5 years.  
For the 97 individuals for whom information is available on the length 
of (non-suspended) prison terms, 11 were for more than 5 years, 41 were in 
the 2-5-year range, 26 in the 1-2year range and 19 were less than 1 year.  
Over 500 investigations are ongoing in 30 Parties.  
 
 51. Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 (2) (c) of the Treaty on European 
Union on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or 
officials of Member States of the European Union, supra note 32 (Art. 12 of the Convention 
stipulates “that any dispute will in an initial stage be examined by the Council in accordance 
with the procedure set out in Title VI of the Treaty on European Union with a view to reaching 
a solution. If no solution is found within six months, a Member State party or the Member 
States parties to the dispute may refer the dispute to the Court of Justice for a ruling.”).   
 52. Mungui-Pippidi, Fostering Good Governance through Trade Agreements, supra 
note 1, at 26. See also Foreign Bribery Enforcement: What Happens to the Public Officials 
on the Receiving End?, OECD (2018), http://www.oecd.org/corruption/Foreign-Bribery-
Enforcement-What-Happens-to-the-Public-Officials-on-the-Receiving-End.pdf.  
 53. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions and Related Documents, supra note 28.   
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At least 155 criminal proceedings (against 146 individuals and 9 
entities) are ongoing for foreign bribery in 11 Parties.54  
Some critics observe that the impact has been minimal, as only 
Germany, the UK and US actually implement the convention.55 Furthermore, 
according to a 2018 OECD report, public officials accepting bribes from 
OECD-based companies are said to run little risk of being punished,   
The report looks at what happened to the public officials in a set of 55 
concluded cases between 2008 and 2013 where OECD-based companies 
were punished for bribing foreign public officials. Of the 55 concluded 
foreign bribery cases, in only one-fifth were formal sanctions imposed on 
one or more public officials.  This is particularly striking because it is for 
cases in which both sides of the bribe transaction—the briber and the public 
official on the receiving end—were subject to the jurisdiction of Parties to 
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, a group of countries that have relatively 
advanced law enforcement and public sector management capabilities.56  
Still others conclude, “the most significant achievement of the OECD 
is that it all member states had effective legislation in place for liability of 
legal persons and expanded their jurisdictional scope to reach extraterritorial 
activities of companies. All 43 state parties to the OECD  
Anti-Bribery Convention now recognize the liability of legal persons 
for foreign bribery.”57  
 
State Laws  
China  
 
 
 54. OECD Working Group on Bribery, supra note 29 (Highlights from the 2017 data: 
“Three countries adopted law reforms designed to support more effective anti-bribery law 
enforcement. Reforms include the lengthening the statute of limitations (Italy), creating 
corporate liability for corruption (Argentina) and reinforcing laws on anti-money laundering 
laws and confiscation of the proceeds of foreign bribery (Japan). Three Parties joined the list 
of jurisdictions that are known to have sanctioned foreign bribery: Brazil, Spain and Australia. 
This brings to 23 the total number of Parties to the Convention that have sanctioned foreign 
bribery at least once, but it also means that 21 Parties have never sanctioned foreign bribery.”).   
 55. Seunghyun Nam, Domestic Impact of the Management Process Under the OECD 
Anti- Bribery Convention, 39 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 955, 970 (2018).   
 56. Foreign Bribery Enforcement: What Happens to the Public Officials on the 
Receiving End?, supra note 52.  
 57. Mungui-Pippidi, Fostering Good Governance through Trade Agreements, supra 
note 1, at 23. 
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China is the “world’s largest exporter, with over 10 per cent of global 
exports and it is failing to enforce its own laws on foreign [emphasis added] 
bribery.”58  
Although China is attractive for FDI, multi-nationals must know with 
whom they do business and be aware of the inherent risks of corruption. 
Transparency International’s 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks 
China a relatively poor 40th.59 A 2018 report, Exporting Corruption 2018, 
“assesses country enforcement against foreign bribery in line with 
obligations in the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. It classifies 44 countries 
into four bands of enforcement based on the data available regarding how 
much they investigate and prosecute companies that pay bribes to win 
business abroad; China is in the fourth and bottom band of 22 countries with 
little or no enforcement.”60  
Although China is not a signatory to the OECD Convention on 
Corruption, China, under President Xi Jinping, has actively pursued 
domestic anticorruption policies.61 China now “offers a comprehensive legal 
framework in both the public and private sectors to criminalize several 
corrupt practices such as facilitation payments, money laundering, active and 
 
 58. Gillian Dell, Time for China to Step Up to Global Anti-Corruption Responsibilities, 
MEDIUM (Oct. 19, 2018), https://voices.transparency.org/time-for-china-to-step-up-to-global-
anti-corruption-responsibilities-fffb80d565be. See also Mungui-Pippidi, Fostering Good 
Governance through Trade Agreements, supra note 1. Dell & McDevitt, supra note 50 (“In 
2014-2017, China’s average share of world exports of goods and services was 10.8 per cent, 
compared with the United States’ 9.9 per cent. As the world’s leading exporter, China has a 
special responsibility with respect to the practices of its companies and business people 
abroad, as they have a significant impact on trade practices. China’s performance regarding 
international anti-corruption standards influences attitudes and behavior in other major 
exporting countries.”).  
 59. Mark Jenkins, Sunny Chu & Christopher Meadors, FCPA compliance in China, 
FRAUD MAG. (Mar. 2014), https://www.fraud-magazine.com/article.aspx?id=4294982094. 
 60. Dell, supra note 58.   
 61. Li Hui, In Chinese Corruption Cases, Who’s Taking What?, SIXTH TONE (Dec. 4, 
2018), https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1003273/in-chinese-corruption-cases%2C-whos-ta 
king-what%3F# (It is argued that “the scale of China’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign 
defies simple description. Over the past six years, more than 1.5 million officials have been 
sanctioned as part of the crackdown, ranging from village committee members to some of the 
country’s most powerful bureaucrats.”). China Corruption Report, GAN BUS. ANTI-
CORRUPTION PORTAL, https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/china/ (“It has 
been alleged that the anti-corruption campaign is at least partly politically motivated. 
Companies are likely to experience bribery, political interference or facilitation payments 
when acquiring public services and dealing with the judicial system. The common practice of 
guanxi is a custom for building connections and relationships based on gifts, banqueting, or 
small favors. Guanxi-related gifts can be considered bribery by foreign companies and by 
national and international anti-corruption laws. Companies are advised to carefully consider 
the type and value of gifts, the occasion, and the nature of the business relation.”).  
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passive bribery, and gifts in the public and in the private sector with the Anti-
Unfair Competition Law focusing on commercial bribery.”62   
The Criminal Code establishes the penalties for those bribing (active) 
and those bribed (passive), ranging from life imprisonment for the former 
and 10 years ’imprisonment for the latter. Private bribery is regulated by the 
Criminal Code and the PRC Anti-Unfair Competition Law (AUCL).63  
“Bribery ’under the Criminal Law means “giving money or property to 
an incumbent or former public official, or the person related to the public 
official (i.e., a close relative or any other person closely related to the 
incumbent or former public official) for the purpose of securing illegitimate 
benefits.”64 Public officials are broadly defined and include personnel in 
public service, state-owned enterprises, institutions, and organizations.65   
Private bribery is regulated by the Criminal Code and the PRC Anti- 
Unfair Competition Law (AUCL). Under Article 164 of the Criminal Code, 
“private bribery” means “giving money or property to any employee of a 
company, enterprise or other entity for the purpose of seeking improper 
interests and benefits. Penalties for violation are up to 10 years ’
imprisonment.”66   
 
 62. China Corruption Report, supra note 61 (While China has criminalized the bribery 
of foreign public officials, in line with obligations under the UN Convention against 
Corruption, there has been no known enforcement by China against foreign corrupt practices 
by its companies, citizens or residents.).  
 63. Mini vandePol, Simon Hui, & Vivian Wu, Anti-Corruption in China, GLOBAL 
COMPLIANCE NEWS, https://globalcompliancenews.com/anti-corruption/handbook/anti-cor 
ruption-in-china/. Dell & McDevitt, supra note 50 (“While China has criminalized the bribery 
of foreign public officials, in line with obligations under the UN Convention against 
Corruption, there has been no known enforcement by China against foreign corrupt practices 
by its companies, citizens or residents.”).  
 64. Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, INT’L LABOUR ORG. (Mar. 14, 
1997), https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/5375/108071/F-78796243/CHN 
5375%20Eng3.pdf (Criminal Code, Articles 389, 390, 390A, and 393). vandePol, Hui, & Wu, 
supra note 63.  
 65. vandePol, Hui, & Wu, supra note 63. Jenkins, Chu, & Meadors, supra note 59 
(Under the U.S. law, FCPA, the “definition of a ‘foreign official’ in China can be more 
problematic than in other countries. The DOJ and SEC broadly interpret it to include all 
Communist Party of China (CPC) members—a large population. The CPC runs parallel to the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in structure and membership. The two entities are difficult 
to separate and appear to be indistinguishable. (Refer to the PDF, Daniel Chow, China Under 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 587.)). China Corruption Report, supra note 61 (CPC 
members may have businesses in the private sector, and if a multinational does business with 
or acquires a CPC-owned company or CPC employee, that CPC member may use political 
connections/favors to obtain business.).  
 66. vandePol, Hui, & Wu, supra note 63 (“The Interim Provisions on Prohibition of 
Commercial Bribery also describe the forms of private bribery under the AUCL, which 
include any money or property provided to the business counterparty or its employee for 
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Article 8 of the AUCL, “private bribery” means giving money or 
property, or secret and off-the-book kickbacks to a business counterparty or 
its employee or using other means to bribe a business counterparty or its 
employee for selling or purchasing goods.”67  
On January 1, 2018, a revised AUCL took effect.68 Compared with the 
previous version of the AUCL, the current AUCL clarifies the definition of 
commercial bribery by listing three categories of entities or individuals who 
could be the recipients of bribes; “(1) an employee of the other party to a 
transaction; (2) the entity or individual authorized by the other party to a 
transaction to handle relevant affairs; and (3) an entity or an individual that 
uses power or influence to affect a transaction.”69  
A significant change in the current AUCL, compared to the previous 
version of the AUCL, is that the transaction counterparty itself has been 
excluded from the categories of potential bribe recipients, which effectively 
narrows the scope of commercial bribery.  It is particularly notable that while 
individual employees of transaction counterparties are included in the 
categories of potential bribe recipients, transaction counterparties 
themselves are excluded.  On this basis, one of the potential interpretations 
could be that beneficial payments made between the two transactional 
parties, such as transactional rebates, may be excluded from the scope of 
commercial bribery.70  
There are three levels of penalties provided by the current AUCL.  
Where a noncriminal administrative offense of commercial bribery is found, 
 
promotion, publicity, sponsorship, scientific research, labor, consultancy, commission, 
reimbursement, or any other benefits such as trips or visits.”).   
 67. Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China, WIPO (Sept. 2, 
1993), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/cn/cn011en.pdf. vandePol, Hui, & Wu, 
supra note 63.   
 68. Hui Xu, Catherine Palmer, Tina Wang, & Sean Wu, China’s Newly Amended Anti-
Unfair Changes the Rules of the Game, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP (2018), https://www.lw. 
com/thoughtLeadership/china-newly-amended-anti-unfair-competition-law-latham 
(“November 4, 2017, the 30th Session of the Standing Committee of the Twelfth National 
People’s Congress passed the revised AUCL, went into effect 2018.”).  
 69. Hui Xu, Sean Wu, & Catherine Palmer, Bribery & Corruption 2019 China, GLI, 
https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/bribery-and-corruption-laws-and-regula 
tions/china. 
 70. Xu, Wu, & Palmer, supra note 69 (“The current AUCL retains the safe harbor 
provisions which allow a business to explicitly pay a discount to the other party to the 
transaction, or pay a commission to an intermediary, as long as both parties faithfully make a 
record in their accountancy book. It is important to note that under the Law of the PRC on 
Donations for Public Welfare (the ‘Donation Law’), donations are to be made voluntarily and 
gratis. Any monetary or goods contributions that are made as donations but with the 
commercial purpose of seeking economic benefits or transaction opportunities will be seen as 
commercial bribes.”).  
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the authorities will confiscate illegal gains, and, depending on the severity of 
the conduct, impose a fine of between RMB 100,000 and RMB 3,000,000.71 
In China, both private and public bribery are illegal. It is a crime to bribe a 
public official regardless of the amount, while private bribes must be over 
RMB 60,000 to be a crime.72 
In China, anticorruption enforcement is not centralized, with many 
different government agencies tasked with fighting corruption. The Supreme 
People’s Procuratorates are the prosecutors but investigations are conducted 
by the General Administration for Combating Embezzlement and Bribery 
and the National Bureau of Corruption Prevention. Penalties include 
imprisonment up to 10 years and fines that are at the discretion of the PRC.73 
Additionally, at the CCP level the CPC Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection, investigates and disciplines cadres that violate the law.74   
In its March 2018 meeting, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) 
approved a constitutional amendment creating a super-sized anticorruption 
body [emphasis added] called the National Supervision Commission and 
adopted a Supervision Law to govern its operations. A massive institutional 
restructuring plan subsequently issued by the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) makes clear the Commission will be co-located with—and integrate 
its anticorruption functions with—the CCP’s own powerful anti-graft body, 
the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) …. But the Law 
fails to subject anticorruption work to the due process requirements of 
China’s criminal justice and administrative law. systems. Instead, its 
stipulations appear to be enforceable only by the state supervisors it purports 
to regulate and by the CCDI.75  
 
 71. See Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 
67 (Authorities may also revoke the business license of the business operator in question if 
the situation is sufficiently serious.). See also Xu, Wu, & Palmer, supra note 69. 
 72. Xu, Wu, & Palmer, supra note 69. 
 73. Business ethics and anti-corruption laws: China, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (June 
2016), https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/406af5db/business-
ethics-and-anti-corruption-laws-china.  
 74. Id. 
 75. Jamie P. Horsley, What’s so controversial about China’s new anti-corruption body?, 
BOOKINGS (May 30, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/whats-so-controversial-
about-chinas-new-anti-corruption-body/ (“This arrangement makes the National Supervision 
Commission ultimately accountable only to the CCP, threatening both to undermine efforts 
to establish law-based governance and to complicate China’s global anti-corruption 
campaign. … Foreign governments may have concerns about certain aspects of international 
legal cooperation with China. The National Supervision Commission may take over a leading 
role in coordinating with foreign governments in areas such as anti-corruption law 
enforcement, extradition, judicial assistance, custody transfer of sentenced persons, asset 
recovery, and information exchanges.”).  
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China has extraterritorial jurisdiction. In China, in accordance with 
Articles 6 and 7 of the PRC Criminal Law, anticorruption laws apply to 
Chinese nationals both within and outside China, and to all companies 
incorporated in China (and their managers) which carry on business 
overseas.76 Under Article 30 of the PRC Criminal Law, corporations can be 
held liable for the acts of their employees, directors and officers under 
criminal, administrative and civil regulations.77 
 
European Union 
 
In addition to the initiative of each state to create anticorruption 
legislation, the EU Convention Against Corruption Involving Officials 1997 
obligates each Member State, including the selected EU Members discussed 
below, to take the necessary measures to ensure that conduct constituting an 
act of passive corruption or active corruption by officials is a punishable 
criminal offense and ensures that conduct constituting an act of passive or 
active corruption, as well as participating in and instigating these acts, is 
punishable by criminal penalties.78  
 
 76. Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 64, at Art. 6-7.  
 77. Id. at Art. 30.  
 78. Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 (2) (c) of the Treaty on European 
Union on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or 
officials of Member States of the European Union, supra note 32. European Anti-Corruption 
Conventions, Anti-Corruption Legislation, GAN BUS. ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL, 
https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/anti-corruption-legislation/european-anti-corruption-
conventions/ (There are also a number of other anticorruption European convention. “Council 
of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (COE Criminal Law Convention). The 
COE Criminal Law Convention aims to coordinate the criminalization of corrupt practices, 
provide complementary criminal law measures and improve cooperation for the prosecution 
of offences. It entered into force in 2002, and compliance is monitored by the Group of States 
against Corruption (GRECO). Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption (COE 
Civil Law Convention) The COE Civil Law Convention aims to define common international 
rules of civil law and corruption. Parties are required to compensate persons who have 
suffered damage as a result of corruption. It entered into force in 2003, and compliance is 
monitored by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). European Union Convention 
against Corruption Involving Officials (EU Convention against Corruption). The EU 
Convention against Corruption aims to fight corruption involving EU or Member States’ 
officials. Member States must ensure that passive or active corruption by officials is a criminal 
offence. Heads of businesses are to be declared criminally liable for active corruption by a 
person under their authority acting on behalf of the company. European Union Convention on 
the Protection of the European Communities’ Financial Interests (EU Convention on 
Financial Interests). The EU Convention on Financial Interests aims to create a common legal 
basis for the criminal protection of the EC’s financial interests. Fraud affecting expenditure 
and revenue must be punishable by criminal penalties.”). 
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Selected EU Members79  
 
In the summary below (including China) followed by a chart of the 
laws, the variables of Selected EU Member State’s anticorruption laws80 are 
highlighted;81 but the question always remains—is there effective 
enforcement? 
 
 
Domestic Laws  
Laws and Coverage82 
 
Although the Members use different terminology, the basic concept of 
a bribe is common to each of the Selected EU Members ’domestic law: “a 
 
 79. These Members are UK, Germany, France, Netherlands, Spain, and Italy.  
 80. The anticorruption laws of the Selected EU States follow. UK: Bribery Act 2010, 
LEGISLATION.GOV.UK (2010), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents. 
Germany: Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der Korruption, BUNDESANZEIGER VERLAG (Nov. 2015), 
https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&start=//*%255B 
@attr_id=%27bgbl115s2025.pdf%27%255D#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27
bgbl115s2025.pdf%27%5D__1464341755722%20/. France: Sapin II (2016), https:// 
www.cjoint.com/doc/16_12/ FLknuHuFltM_loisapin2.pdf. Spain: Criminal Code Art. 286 & 
419-38, MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA (2013), https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/64 
43/file/Spain_CC_am2013_en.pdf. Italy: Codice penale Art. 318-322, ALTALEX.COM (2020), 
https://www.altalex.com/documents/codici-altalex/2014/10/30/codice-penale. Netherlands: 
Wetboek van Strafrech 177-178, SHERLOC UNODC (Aug. 27, 2014), https://sherloc.unodc. 
org/res/cld/document/nld/1881/penal-code-of-the-netherlands_html/ Netherlands_Penal_Co 
de_1881_as_amd_2014.pdf. Also included is China: Hui Xu, Sean Wu, & Catherine Palmer, 
Bribery & Corruption 2020|China, GLI, https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-ar 
eas/bribery-and-corruption-laws-and-regulations/china. See generally Mungiu-Pippidi, supra 
note 1. 
 81. For an overview description of each law, see as follows. Germany: Thomas Helck, 
Bribery & Corruption 2020|Germany, GLI,  https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-
areas/bribery-and-corruption-laws-and-regulations/germany#chaptercontent1. Spain: Rafael 
Jimenez-Gusi, Cecilia Pastor, & Diego Pol, Anti-Corruption in Spain, GLOBAL COMPLIANCE 
NEWS, https://globalcompliancenews.com/anti-corruption/anti-corruption-in-spain/. UK: 
Jonathan Pickworth & Jo Dimmock, Bribery & Corruption 2020|United Kingdom, GLI,  
https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/bribery-and-corruption-laws-and-regula 
tions/united-kingdom#chaptercontent1. France: Eric Lasry, Sara Koski, & Clotilde Guyot-
Rechard, Anti-Corruption in France, GLOBAL COMPLIANCE NEWS, https://globalcomplia 
ncenews.com/anti-corruption/handbook/anti-corruption-in-france/. Italy: Riccardo Ovidi, 
Italy’s New Anti-Corruption Law, GLOBAL COMPLIANCE NEWS (Mar. 15, 2019), https://glo 
balcompliancenews.com/italys-new-anti-corruption-law-20190228/.  
 82. See Bonelli E. Pappalardo et al., Complying with Bribery Laws in Key European 
Jurisdictions, De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek (2012), https://www.debrauw.com/wp-
content/uploads/NEWS%20-%20PUBLICATIONS/European-Bribery-Memo.pdf (for more 
on EU member bribery laws).  
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benefit, or something of value, given to someone to affect their behavior for 
the benefit of the offender or someone he represents or favors.”83 All 
Selected EU Members expressly (or effectively) treat rewarding after the 
event as bribery.84 The bribery of domestic or foreign officials is also an 
offense in each of the Member States.85  
The UK, Germany, and France criminalize private to private bribery the 
same as private to public.86 In Italy, in the private sector, only certain key 
corporate officers face criminal liability for bribery; and then only if their 
actions are against the interests of their company.87 Spain criminalizes 
private sector bribery if it infringes the relevant person’s obligations in the 
acquisition or sale of goods or the hiring of professional services.88 In the 
Netherlands, private sector bribery is criminalized if the bribed person 
conceals his gift or promise from his employer in breach of the requirement 
to act in good faith.89   
The laws of the Selected EU Members broadly criminalize bribery by 
public officials (or their acceptance of bribes) at home or abroad and the 
bribery in the private sector; however, they take slightly different approaches 
to so-called “facilitation payments.”90   
The definitions of “public official” vary between the Selected EU 
Members, but all have a “wide spectrum, generally presenting non-exclusive 
examples, extending to EU and other supra-national or international 
functionaries and key decision makers (such as judges).”91 In each of the 
Member States, the term may extend to executives of foreign nationalized 
industries.92 
 
Remedies and Enforcement Agencies 
 
 
 83. Id. at 1. 
 84. See Selected EU Member laws, supra note 80. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Selected EU Member laws: UK, Germany, and France, supra note 80. 
 87. Codice penale Art. 318-322, ALTALEX.COM (2020), https://www.altalex.com/ 
documents/codici-altalex/2014/10/30/codice-penale. 
 88. Criminal Code Art. 286 & 419-38, MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA (2013), https://www. 
legislationline.org/ download/id/6443/file/Spain_CC_am2013_en.pdf.  
 89. Wetboek van Strafrech 177-178, SHERLOC UNODC (Aug. 27, 2014), https://sherloc. 
unodc.org/res/cld/document/nld/1881/penal-code-of-thenetherlands_html/Nether 
lands_Penal_Code_1881_as_amd_2014.pdf. 
 90. See generally Selected EU Member laws, supra note 80. See also Bonelli E. 
Pappalardo et al., supra note 82.  
 91. See also Bonelli E. Pappalardo et al., supra note 82, at 2. 
 92. See Selected EU Member laws, supra note 80.  
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All Selected EU Members impose serious penalties on offenders. These 
include confiscation of the benefits of the bribery, substantial fines, and 
prison terms.93 All provide some form of penalties for legal entities.94  In 
Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK, violating corporations can be banned 
from public contracting.95 “Other potential penalties include withdrawal of 
public subsidies or funding (Germany, Italy, Spain), disqualification from 
carrying on the business in which the bribery occurred (France, Italy, Spain), 
withdrawal of licenses (Germany, Italy), court supervision (France, Italy) 
and liquidation (France, Italy, Spain).”96 The UK, Germany, France, and 
Italy may sentence violators up to ten years in prison while in Spain and the 
Netherlands the max is six years. Each nation has a different cap on fines, 
ranging from €600,000 to an unlimited amount.97  
The Selected EU Members have two different approaches to 
enforcement infrastructure. The UK, Spain, France, and Italy have separate 
departments established to prosecute corruption cases.98 While, Germany 
and the Netherlands put the task to the state prosecutor’s office.99   
 
 
Extra-territorial Jurisdiction and Corporate Liability  
 
The laws of all Selected EU Members have some extraterritorial effect. 
All criminalize the bribery of domestic officials (by anyone) and of foreign 
officials by their own nationals, or legal entities established or carrying on 
business in their territories, even if the bribery occurs overseas provided it is 
also illegal where it occurs.100 In the UK, an act committed overseas which 
would be considered bribery in the UK, may be criminalized unless it is 
 
 93. Id.  
 94. See Selected EU Member laws, supra note 80. 
 95. Selected EU Member laws: Germany, Spain, and Italy, supra note 80.  
 96. Westbroek, supra note 82, at 3.   
 97. See, Selected EU Member laws; Bribery Act (U.K., 2010, 23). Law on the Fight 
Against Corruption (Ger., 2019, 2). Sapin II (Fr., 2017). Criminal Code (Spain, 2013, 286 & 
419-38). Criminal Code (It., 2015, 318-22). Criminal Code (Neth., 2012, 177-78). See also, 
Westbroek supra note 82. 
 98. Spain: Spanish Anti-Corruption Prosecution Office, https://www.mjusticia.gob. 
es/cs/Satellite/Portal/es/inicio. UK: Serious Fraud Office, https://www.sfo.gov.uk/.France: 
French Anti-Corruption Agency, https://www.economie.gouv.fr/. Italy: Italian Anticorruption 
Authority, https://www.anticorruzione.it/portal/public/classic/MenuServizio/ENG/Aboutus.   
 99. Germany:https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/bribery-and-corrupti 
on-laws-andregulations/germany#chaptercontent1; Netherlands: https://www.globallegalins 
ights.com/practice-areas/bribery-andcorruption-laws-and-regulations/netherlands. 
 100. See Selected EU Member laws: UK, Germany, and France, supra note 80.  
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expressly permitted by local written law, and a corporation can incur liability 
on account of acts of bribery by associated persons outside the jurisdiction.101 
Similarly, in the Netherlands, bribery of public officials by Dutch corporates 
or Dutch nationals is criminalized irrespective of whether it is illegal where 
the bribery occurs, however, some part of the improper conduct must occur 
within its borders.102 Italy subjects companies carrying on business within its 
borders to its worldwide jurisdiction where the bribery concerns public 
officials if some part of the improper conduct (including its mere conception 
and/or planning) has been carried out in Italy.103 In France, Germany, and 
Spain, persons and businesses are liable for any act of bribery as long as it is 
illegal in the location the act was committed.104 Additionally, in Spain any 
bribery of a foreign public official is illegal.105  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Chart 
 
Country   Laws and Coverage  Extraterritorial   Remedies  Corporate 
Liability  
Enforcement Agency  
United  
Kingdom  
Both private and 
public Illegal  
Any bribe that isn’t 
expressly permitted by 
foreign law  
Up to 10 
years in 
prison. Fine 
Unlimited   
May be liable for 
acts by “associated 
persons”.  
Serious Fraud Office  
 
 101. Bribery Act 2010, LEGISLATION.GOV.UK (2010), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
ukpga/2010/23/contents. 
 102. Wetboek van Strafrech 177-178, SHERLOC UNODC (Aug. 27, 2014), https://sherloc. 
unodc.org/res/cld/document/nld/1881/penal-code-of-thenetherlands_html/Netherlands_Pen 
al_Code_1881_as_amd_2014.pdf. 
 103. Codice penale Art. 318-322, ALTALEX.COM (2020), https://www.altalex.com/docu 
ments/codici-altalex/2014/10/30/codice-penale.  
 104. Germany: Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der Korruption, BUNDESANZEIGER VERLAG (Nov. 
2015), https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&start=//*% 
255B@attr_id=%27bgbl115s2025.pdf%27%255D#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3
D%27bgbl115s2025.pdf%27%5D__1464341755722%20/. France: Sapin II (2016), https:// 
www.cjoint.com/doc/16_12/ FLknuHuFltM_loisapin2.pdf.   
 105. Criminal Code Art. 286 & 419-38, MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA (2013), https:// 
www.legislationline.org/download/id/6443/file/Spain_CC_am2013_en.pdf.   
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Germany  Both private and 
public Illegal  
Any bribe that is also 
a crime in the foreign 
nation  
Up to 10 
years in 
prison. Fine 
up to €10 
Million.  
May be liable for 
acts by employees or 
agents acting on 
behalf of the 
corporation.  
State Prosecutor 
Office  
France  Both private and 
public Illegal  
Any bribe that is also 
a crime in the foreign 
nation  
Up to 10 
years in 
prison. Fine 
up to €5 
Million.  
May be liable for 
acts for their benefit 
by employees or  
other 
representatives.  
French 
AntiCorruption Agency 
   
Netherlands  Public illegal, 
private only if bribe is 
concealed and 
breaches duty of 
loyalty  
Only Dutch nationals 
if some part of act was 
in Netherlands   
Up to 6 
years in 
prison. Fine 
up to 
€820,000   
May be liable if 
conduct can 
reasonably be 
attributed to the 
corporation.  
State Prosecutor 
Office  
Spain  Public illegal, 
private only if related 
to hiring.  
Any bribery of a 
foreign public official 
or any bribe that is also 
a crime in the foreign 
nation  
Up to 6 
years in 
prison. Fine 
up to 5x 
profit  
May be liable for 
acts for their benefit 
by employees or  
other 
representatives.  
Anti-Corruption  
Prosecutor’s Office  
Italy  Public illegal, 
private only if by key 
corporate officers; and 
only if it goes against 
corporate interests.  
Any bribery of public 
officials if some part of 
act was in Italy  
Up to 10 
years in 
prison. Fine 
up to 
€600,000.  
May be liability for 
acts undertaken by 
employees or 
“associated persons”   
National Anti- 
Corruption  
Authority  
China  Public Illegal, 
private if over RMB 
60,000  
For Chinese  
Nationals any act that 
is illegal in China, and 
any foreigners who act 
against the PRC state or 
against its citizens  
Up to 10 
years 
Fines at 
State’s 
discretion  
May be liable for  
the acts of their 
employees, directors 
and officers  
National Bureau of  
Corruption  
Prevention of the  
PRC & Supreme  
People’s  
Procuratorates 
 
Enforcement of Laws  
 
Transparency International evaluated OECD countries ’foreign bribery 
enforcement under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention; and below, the 
Selected EU countries and China are separated and highlighted.106  
 
 106. Dell & McDevitt, supra note 50. (Transparency International explains its 
methodology as follows. “The enforcement categories (Active, Moderate, Limited, Little or 
No) show the level of enforcement efforts against foreign bribery. A country that is an “Active 
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Active Enforcement: United States, Germany, UK, Italy.   
Limited Enforcement: France, Netherlands,   
Little or No Enforcement: Spain, and China.107  
The enforcement of anticorruption laws in the Selected EU States is as 
follows.  
Between 2014-2017: Germany has commenced 40 investigations and 
opened 13 cases for corruption charges; the UK has commenced 36 
investigations and opened nine cases; Italy has commenced 27 investigations 
and opened 16 cases; France has commenced 40 cases and opened one case; 
the Netherlands commenced seven investigations and opened two cases; and 
Spain has commenced six investigations and opened two cases.108  
In the United Kingdom, the Serious Fraud Office, in charge of Bribery 
Act enforcement, has conducted 36 complete investigations, and is currently 
investigating 41 new cases.109   
In France, the French Anti-Corruption Agency has achieved three 
convictions since being created in 2017.110 Two high-profile bribery 
investigations are still pending: one involving a French Olympic Committee 
member accused of accepting bribes for voting for Brazil in 2016, and the 
second involving Electricite de France that opened in 2018.111  
 
enforcer” initiates many investigations into foreign bribery offences; these investigations 
reach the courts; the authorities press charges and courts convict individuals and/or companies 
both in ordinary cases and in major cases in which bribers are convicted and receive 
substantial sanctions. “Moderate Enforcement” and “Limited Enforcement” indicate stages of 
progress but are considered insufficient deterrence. Where there is “Little or No 
Enforcement”, there is no deterrence.” Recent improvements in the legal frameworks and 
enforcement are highlighted on pages 18-19). 
 107. Id. at 4. See also Foreign Bribery Rages Unchecked in Over Half of Global Trade, 
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (2018) https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/exportin 
g-corruption-2018. (The number of investigations and prosecutions between 2014-2017 is 
contained in a summarizing chart).   
 108. Dell & McDevitt, supra note 50.  
 109. Our Cases, SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, https://www.sfo.gov.uk/our-cases/#aza (In 2018 
the Serious Fraud Office secured convictions of two directors of Skansen Interiors Ltd., 
resulting in prison sentences of 12 and 20 months). Bribery & Corruption United Kingdom, 
GLOBAL LEGAL INSIGHTS, (2019) https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/bribe 
ry-and-corruption-laws-and-regulations/united-kingdom  
 110. Jones Day, France Takes Next Step in Anticorruption Enforcement: First “French 
DPAs” and What Companies Should Know (Apr. 2018), https://www.jonesday.com/france-
takes-next-step-in-anticorruption-enforcement-firstfrench-dpas-and-what-companies-
should-know-04-26-2018/.   
 111. GLI, Bribery & Corruption 2019 France, https://www.globallegalinsights.com/prac 
tice-areas/bribery-andcorruption-laws-and-regulations/France/.  
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German authorities since 1999 have convicted 67 legal entities and 328 
individuals for violations of anticorruption laws.112 In 2014 about 20,000 
corruption crimes were registered nationwide in Germany, whereas in 2017 
that number dropped to about 5,000. A recent case was brought against 
Airbus by the Munich Public Prosecutor for paying bribes in relation to the 
sale of Fighter Jets and  resulted in a fine of €81,300,000.113  
In Italy, Milan prosecutors convicted the foreign companies Saipem 
Spa for bribing Nigerian public officials resulting in the forfeiture of €24.5 
million in profits. The Milan Court of Appeals is currently reviewing the 
conviction and sentencing of the President of the Lombardy Region for 
bribery. The Prosecutor’s Office of Rome is currently investigating top 
Roman politicians and businessmen for corruption and conspiracy with 
known Mafia figures.114  
In Spain, there are ongoing cases of corruption in international 
economic transactions under investigation in the courts; and in 2017, two 
persons were convicted by the National High Court (Audiencia Nacional).115  
In the Netherlands, over the last three years, Dutch prosecutors have 
reached large settlements with many large corporations, VimpelCom Ltd 
paid $ 397.5 million in 2016, Telia Company AB paid $274 million in 2017, 
and ING Bank NV paid €775 million in 2018.116  
Settlements may or may not be useful in fighting international 
corruption. Transparency International’s position is that while useful, unless 
they are made public, they do not deter corrupt practices. 
Settlements can provide an important channel to hold companies to 
account for wrongdoing and resolve foreign bribery cases without resorting 
to a full trial or administrative proceeding. In many cases, they have helped 
to boost enforcement of foreign bribery laws and to improve corporate 
compliance. However, their deterrent effect is questionable if they are not 
transparent, do not provide effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, 
and if there is no meaningful judicial review.117 
 
 112. OECD, IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION: GERMANY 5 
(Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2018), http://www.oecd.org/ 
corruption/anti-bribery/Germany-Phase-4-Report-ENG.pdf.  
 113. GLI, Bribery & Corruption 2019 Germany, https://www.globallegalinsights.com 
/practice-areas/bribery-and-corruption-laws-and-regulations/germany.   
 114. GLI, Bribery & Corruption 2019 Italy, https://www.globallegalinsights.com/ 
practice-areas/bribery-andcorruption-laws-and-regulations/italy.   
 115. GLI, Bribery & Corruption 2019 Spain, https://www.globallegalinsights.com/ 
practice-areas/bribery-andcorruption-laws-and-regulations/spain.   
 116. GLI, Bribery & Corruption 2019 Netherlands, https://www.globallegalinsights.com/ 
practiceareas/bribery-and-corruption-laws-and-regulations/netherlands/.   
 117. Dell & McDevitt, supra note 50.   
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Chinese Enforcement  
 
A recent prosecution of a Chinese company inside China under the 
Anti-Unfair Competition Law for corruption is illustrated by the following 
case.118  
In November 2017, NT Medical Information Consultant (Shanghai) Co. 
Ltd. was found liable for commercial bribery in the form of the payment of 
conference fees, promotion fees, and similar fees to relevant departments and 
persons in hospitals, for the purpose of promoting sales.119   
Foreign companies operating in China will also be prosecuted.  
In the summer of 2013, GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”), a British 
pharmaceutical company listed on both the London and New York stock 
exchanges, became the focus of the biggest corruption scandal in China 
involving a foreign company.  The GSK chain was accused of bribing 
doctors in order to promote GSK’s medical products. GSK was found to have 
offered money or property to nongovernment personnel in order to obtain 
improper commercial gains and was found guilty of bribing non-government 
personnel.  GSK was ordered to pay a fine of RMB 3bn (£297m) to the 
Chinese government. Five former GSK senior executives were sentenced to 
suspended imprisonment of two to three years.120  
Under the CCP’s Judicial Commission,Supervisory commissions are 
State anticorruption agencies. The National Supervisory Commission is the 
highest State supervisory organ, and all provincial, city and county-level 
regions have their own supervisory commissions…. [A]bout 33,000 people 
in 28,000 cases were convicted of taking bribes or dereliction of duty last 
 
 118. Todd Liao & Judy Wang, China Announces Crackdown Campaign Against Unfair 
Competition Activities, JD SUPRA, June 27, 2018, https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/china-
announces-crackdown-campaign-35601/. 
 119. The payments were made by pharmaceutical representatives to doctors and other 
individuals at the hospitals in the form of a rebate, which was directly based upon the volume 
of sales at those hospitals. Investigators from the Shanghai Administrative Bureau of Industry 
and Commerce concluded that these unreported rebates to hospital personnel were made in 
exchange for business opportunities and sales promotion, and that they constituted 
commercial bribery under the PRC Anti-Unfair Competition Law. The company’s illegal 
profits were confiscated, and the company was fined 180,000 renminbi ($27,381). Todd Liao 
& Judy Wang, China Announces Crackdown Campaign Against Unfair Competition 
Activities, JD SUPRA, June 27, 2018, https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/china-announces-
crackdown-campaign-35601/.   
 120. GLI, Bribery & Corruption 2019 China, https://www.globallegalinsights.com/ 
practice-areas/bribery-andcorruption-laws-and-regulations/china.  
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year, Chief Justice Zhou Qiang said in the [2018] work report of the Supreme 
People’s Court.121  
 
FCPA of U.S. 
 
The FCPA122 is a formidable presence in the fight against international 
corruption. With this law, the U.S. uses anticorruption laws and sanctions to 
police the world! 123  It does not matter that there were no American citizens 
involved – since 1977, the FCPA has allowed the US to become the 
anticorruption policeman for the whole world.”124 
 
 121. Zhang Yan, Pressure Still High On Graft During Supervision Reform, China Daily, 
Mar. 13, 2019, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201903/13/WS5c88005ea3106c65c34ee3ea. 
html. See also Jamie P. Horsley, What’s So Controversial About China’s New Anti-
Corruption Body?, DIPLOMAT, May 30, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/whats-
socontroversial-about-chinas-new-anti-corruption-body/. (“The Commission is co-located 
with and has integrated its anti-corruption functions with the CCP’s own powerful anti-graft 
body, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI)…. But the Law fails to 
subject anti-corruption work to the due process requirements of China’s criminal justice and 
administrative law systems. Instead, its stipulations appear to be enforceable only by the state 
supervisors it purports to regulate and by the CCDI.”). 
 122. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq., available 
at https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt-practices-act. The top ten FCPA 
settlements: 1. Petrobras (Brazil) - $1.78 billion in 2018; 2. Telia Company (Sweden) - $965 
million in 2017; 3. Siemens (Germany) - $800 million in 2008; 4. VimpelCom (Netherlands) 
- $795 million in 2016; 5. Alstom (France) - $772 million in 2014; 6. Société Générale 
(France) - $585 million in 2018; 7. Halliburton (US) - $579 million in 2009; 8. Teva 
Pharmaceutical(Israel) - $519 million in 2016; 9. Keppel Offshore & Marine (Singapore) - 
$422 million in 2017; 10. Och-Ziff (US) - $412 million in 2016. Petrobras agrees to biggest 
FCPA settlement, BIZBLOG, https://www.lexisnexis.com/communities/lexisnexis_biz/b/biz 
blog/archive/2018/10/05/a-new-no-1-petrobrasagrees-to-biggest-fcpa-settlement.aspx. See 
also FCPA Digest 2019 – Recent Trends and Patterns in the Enforcement of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, https://www.shearman.com/perspectives/2019/01/shearman-fcpa-di 
gest-2019and-recent-trends-and-patterns-in-fcpa. (“The DOJ entered into its first coordinated 
resolution with authorities in a foreign bribery case, possibly heralding the emergence of 
France as an important global anticorruption authority.”). Id. at 5.  
 123. Finbarr Bermingham, Explained: How the US Uses Anticorruption Laws and 
Sanctions to Police the World, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 8, 2018), https://www. 
scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2176998/explained-how-us-uses-anticorruption-
laws-andsanctions-police. (“There are a lot of instances where the total conduct has taken 
place outside the US, by non-US persons. It’s a non-US company and non-US government 
officials, going about their business outside the US. But if any of the money transited through 
the US, if there was a bank account that was draw on there, or if a server based in the US was 
used to send an email, there is jurisdiction,” quoting Wendy Wysong, who leads the Asia-
Pacific anticorruption and trade controls practice at law firm Clifford Chance). 
 124. Id. The cases of Patrick Ho and Sabrina Meng Wanzhou show the extraterritorial 
reach of US authorities. Conviction of former Hong Kong minister Patrick Ho in a New York 
court and the detention of Huawei’s chief financial officer, Sabrina Meng Wanzhou, in 
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Enforcement of the law has been vigorous and consistent 
 
In 2018, the DOJ and SEC resolved seventeen corporate enforcement 
actions. Consistent with the trends and patterns over the past years, the DOJ 
apparently deferred to the SEC to bring civil enforcement cases in the less 
egregious matters, which has resulted in the SEC bringing eight enforcement 
actions without parallel DOJ actions and typically with lower penalty 
amounts.… Of the FCPA enforcement actions against individuals, 2018 has 
seen twenty-one individuals charged by the DOJ (or had charges unsealed), 
while the SEC brought cases against only four individuals.125   
The FCPA operates at a globally efficient level of enforcement with 
successful results.126 With a strong administrative agency and civil and 
criminal penalties127 aimed to deter corruption, it is a welcome ally to other 
countries ’anticorruption fights.  
Its reach is further expanded by the U.S. incorporating it as a provision 
in its FTAs.128  
 
Canada have demonstrated the global reach of United States law enforcement. Ho was 
convicted for money laundering and bribery, pertaining to oil rights in Chad and Uganda, on 
behalf of CEFC China Energy under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), a US law 
aimed at combating bribery of foreign officials. Huawei CFO ‘committed fraud to skirt Iran 
sanctions.  
 125. FCPA Digest January 2019: Enforcement Actions and Strategies, SHEARMAN AND 
STERLING at 5 https://fcpa.shearman.com/siteFiles/FCPA%20Headlines/fcpa-recenttrends 
.pdf. See also Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1 at 26 (The “recent Petrobras case shows another 
route to enforcement, with international investors seeking redress under US civil law. 
Hundreds of holders of Petrobras stock have begun to file ‘derivative suits’ through which 
shareholders can sue a company’s directors and officers for breaching their fiduciary duties 
to that company.”).  
 126. The top ten FCPA settlements: 1. Petrobras (Brazil) - $1.78 billion in 2018; 2. Telia 
Company (Sweden) - $965 million in 2017; 3. Siemens (Germany) - $800 million in 2008; 4. 
VimpelCom (Netherlands) - $795 million in 2016; 5. Alstom (France) - $772 million in 2014; 
6. Société Générale (France) - $585 million in 2018; 7. Halliburton (US) - $579 million in 
2009; 8. Teva Pharmaceutical (Israel) - $519 million in 2016; 9. Keppel Offshore & Marine 
(Singapore) - $422 million in 2017; 10.  Och-Ziff (US) - $412 million in 2016. Lisa 
Thompson, Petrobras agrees to biggest FCPA settlement, BIZBLOG, Oct. 5, 2018, https:// 
www.lexisnexis.com/communities/lexisnexis_biz/b/bizblog/archive/2018/10/05/a-newno-1-
petrobras-agrees-to-biggest-fcpa-settlement.aspx. 
 127. IDENTIFY FCPA FOREIGN CORRUPTION ANTI-BRIBERY RISKS AND PREVENT 
VIOLATIONS, https://www.visualofac.com/regulations/fcpa-violations-penalties/. See also 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES 
ACT, (2012), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf.   
 128. “It is U.S. Government policy to promote good governance, including host countries’ 
implementation and enforcement of anti-corruption laws and policies pursuant to their 
obligations under international agreements. Since enactment of the FCPA, the United States 
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The China Initiative, a 2018 DOJ-wide initiative, focuses on 
“identifying and prosecuting Chinese economic espionage” in the U.S. and 
will focus mostly on trade and intellectual property, with one of its goals to 
“identify Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) cases involving Chinese 
companies that compete with American businesses.”129   
Interestingly, foreign investors in China can also find themselves within 
the reach of U.S. law, under the FCPA.   
Morgan Stanley’s real estate and fund advisory managing director, 
Garth Peterson, colluded with a former chairman of a Chinese state-owned 
enterprise, Yongye Enterprise Group. Peterson paid the Chinese official and 
himself “finder’s fees” of $1.8 million that Morgan Stanley owed to third 
parties. In exchange for the fees and personal interest in Morgan Stanley’s 
investments, the Chinese official brought business to Morgan Stanley.130  
 
 
Anticorruption Provisions in FTAs  
 
Bilateral and regional trade agreements have come to supplement the 
WTO’s good governance provisions and incorporated explicit anticorruption 
and transparency provisions into their agreements. 
The RTAs have grown over time both in absolute numbers … and in 
depth, particularly among the EU’s trade partners…. Over the last two 
decades it has become common for a number of states to enshrine the 
principle of transparency in the preambles to their bilateral and regional 
trade. … Furthermore, certain trade agreements have begun to include a 
 
has been instrumental to the expansion of the international framework to fight corruption.  
Several significant components of this framework are the Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions negotiated under the 
auspices of the OECD (Antibribery Convention), the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (UN Convention), the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (OAS 
Convention), the Council of Europe Criminal and Civil Law Conventions, and a growing list 
of U.S. free trade agreements.” EXPORT.GOV, https://www.export.gov/article?id=Corruption. 
“While it is U.S. Government policy to include anticorruption provisions in free trade 
agreements (FTAs) that it negotiates with its trading partners, the anticorruption provisions 
have evolved over time.  The most recent FTAs negotiated now require trading partners to 
criminalize ‘active bribery’ of public officials (offering bribes to any public official must be 
made a criminal offense, both domestically and trans-nationally) as well as domestic ‘passive 
bribery’ (solicitation of a bribe by a domestic official). All U.S. FTAs may be found at the 
U.S. Trade Representative Website: http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements.” 
 129. FCPA Digest January 2019: Enforcement Actions and Strategies, supra note 125, at 
5. For a comprehensive review of cases, see FCPA Digest 28, https://fcpa.shearman. 
com/?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIjd-V46v93wIVqh6tBh3yhAT7EAMYAiAAEgIV5fD. 
 130. Jenkins, Chu, & Meadors, supra note 59. 
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‘horizontal ’chapter on transparency which extends transparency obligations 
to all policy areas of the trade agreement in question.131  
The practicality of BITs in anticorruption fights is debatable; as the 
legality usually turns on local anticorruption laws as opposed to 
anticorruption provisions in the BIT.132 Some argue investment treaty 
arbitration outside the local legal institutions can be useful in resolving these 
disputes; but even this approach can be complicated. BITs from the Selected 
EU members and China contain no transparency or anticorruption 
language.133  
The usual setting within which investment arbitration is taking place is 
that of an investor bringing a claim against a host state, e.g. for compensation 
for loss of investment. By invoking the so-called corruption defense, 
however, the table turns, and it is the host state bringing a counterclaim 
against the investor by invoking acts of corruption, e.g. bribery, as a means 
to preclude any claims an investor might make and evade every liability. The 
raison d’être of the corruption defense is that while arbitral tribunals are not 
tasked with punishing acts of corruption, they clearly ‘cannot grant 
assistance to a party that has engaged in a corrupt act.134’ 
 
 
 131. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1, at 16-18. (“For instance, it has become standard 
practice for US trade agreements to include specific anti-corruption and anti-bribery 
commitments into cross-cutting transparency chapters. At least until very recently US 
anticorruption in international trade was similarly enhanced by the increased implementation 
of the FCPA and the inclusion of references in its texts to anti-bribery laws.”).  
 132. Angelos Dimopoulos, ANTI‐CORRUPTION ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW 2 (OCT. 4, 2015) http://www.law.kobeu.ac.jp/STP/GMAPs/ppt/0_4_1_Angelos.pdf. See 
also, Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1. See also Yu-Ting Ye, Toward a Balanced and Liberal 
Chinese Bilateral Treaty Regime in the Context of One Belt One Road, 41 HOUSTON INT’L J. 
107 (2018); Jason Yackee, Investment Treaties and Investor Corruption: An Emerging 
Defense for Host States?, (Oct. 19, 2012), INT’L INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, 
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/10/19/investment-treaties-and-investor-corruption-an-emergin 
g-defense-for-hoststates/. 
 133. BITs are available at UNCTAD, Investment Policy Hub, https://investmentpolicy 
hubold.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu. See also Yu-Ting Ye, supra note 133. 
(“While it may be tempting to harness the power of investment arbitration in the international 
fight against corruption, investment tribunals are ill-suited to hear allegations of corruption. 
The in pari delicto rule may encourage rather than discourage bribery, and investment 
arbitration tribunals fail to take into account the purpose of bribes. Undoubtedly, the 
international anti-corruption campaign should continue through other domestic and 
international means, but investment arbitration is a poor forum for the airing of allegations of 
corruption.”). See also Leo O’Toole, Investment Arbitration: A Poor Forum for the 
International Fight Against Corruption, https://www.yjil.yale.edu/investmentarbitration-a-
poor-forum-for-the-international-fight-against-corruption/. 
 134. Mbiyavanga, supra note 40. See also Reeder, supra note 44. 
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FTAs  Transparency 
Requirements  
Anticorruption 
Requirements  
Good Governance 
Requirements   
Enforceable  
EU   X    X  X  
China   X    X  X  
USA   X  X  X  X  
CPTPP   X  X  X  X  
 
European Union135  
 
In a Report for the Committee on International Trade of the European 
Parliament, “evidence showed that international trade agreements have the 
potential to act as the exogenous factor breaking the vicious circle of 
corruption in economies based on privileged connections rather than fair 
competition.”136 The Report argues further, 
 
The options offered are between an ‘economist’s approach ’
with an apparently more modest but effective good governance 
package, a ‘lawyer’s ’approach ’with firm anticorruption language 
but unenforceable provisions even in EU countries (on bribery, for 
instance), and a ‘holistic ’approach where the EU would 
coordinate across international trade, promotion of norms and 
development aid to have a strong and consistent approach 
demanding good governance as part of its foreign and 
development policy.137 
 
 135. EU’s promise of fighting corruption is “gradually being translated into action with 
new anticorruption provisions foreseen in the coming updated EU Mexico Global Agreement 
and recently launched EU Chile Association Agreement upgrade. The EU’s trade agreements 
add to the WTO’s baseline on procurements and customs through dedicated chapters which 
reinforce transparency provisions and electronic handling of public tenders and customs 
paperwork, for example. Recent EU trade agreements also include general transparency 
provisions in domestic regulation, namely for services. The chapter on investment protection 
in CETA, the trade agreement with Canada, stipulates that foreign investors that have paid 
bribes to obtain contracts will be excluded from the protection offered by the investment court 
foreseen in the treaty.” Iana Dreyer, FTAs: How the EU Is Approaching the Fight Against 
Corruption, BORDERLEX, (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.borderlex.eu/2018/01/24/ftas-how-
the-eu-is-approaching-the-fight-against-corruption/.  
 136. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1, at 5. 
 137. Id. 
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Illustrative provisions from EU FTAs, such as in the Canada-EU Trade 
Agreement (CETA), are as follows.138  
Art 27.1 “Each Party shall ensure that its laws, regulations, procedures 
and administrative rulings of general application respecting any matter 
covered by this Agreement are promptly published or made available in such 
a manner as to enable interested persons and the other Party to become 
acquainted with them.”  
Art. 27.4 “Each Party shall establish or maintain judicial, quasi-judicial 
or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose of the prompt 
review and, if warranted, correction of final administrative actions regarding 
matters covered by this Agreement. Each Party shall ensure that its tribunals 
are impartial and independent of the office or authority entrusted with 
administrative enforcement and that they do not have any substantial interest 
in the outcome of the matter.”  
The question is whether the anticorruption provisions will be drafted to 
successfully allow them within the scope of the dispute resolution 
procedures, either directly or by their affecting other FTA provisions.139 
Model language has been proposed.140  
 
 138. Free Trade Agreement, Can.-EU, Chapter 27, 2016 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/ 
in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-bychapter/. Free Trade Agreement, EU-Japan, Chapter 17, 2018, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1684.   
 139. Article 18.18 provides for the scope. “1. Without prejudice to the rights and 
obligations of the Parties under Chapter Twenty-Nine (Dispute Settlement), an investor of a 
Party may submit to the Tribunal constituted under this Section a claim that the other Party 
has breached an obligation under: Section C, with respect to the expansion, conduct, 
operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment and sale or disposal of its covered 
investment, or Section D, where the investor claims to have suffered loss or damage as a result 
of the alleged breach.” Article 8.18.3 further provides: “Investors’ are precluded from 
submitting claims for the resolution of investment disputes when such investment is made 
corruptly or by other unlawful action.” There also is an obligation of governments to conduct 
procurement procedures in a manner that will prevent corrupt practices (Article 19.4(4c)). 
 140. Scope of FTA’s dispute mechanism on corruption: “Increasingly, investment treaties 
explicitly include references to corruption. Examples include … CETA. The proposed article 
builds on the UN and OECD conventions on bribery but closes a loophole that allows 
payments to be made to a family member or business associate instead of directly to a 
politician or senior official. Implementation of the article from most enforcement and penal 
perspectives is through domestic law. However, by including this clause, a breach is also a 
breach of the treaty. Proposed [Model] Language [emphasis added] 1. Investors and their 
investments shall not, prior to the establishment of an Investment or afterwards, offer, promise 
or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, 
to a public official of the Host State, or a member of an official’s family or business associate 
or other person in close proximity to an official, for that official or for a third party, in order 
that the official or third party act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of 
official duties, in order to achieve any favour in relation to a proposed Investment or any 
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Another more recent trade agreement between the EU and Vietnam 
(EUVIPA) incorporates an investment court system with a tribunal and an 
appellate tribunal.141 The conciliation and mediation mechanisms under 
CETA and EUVIPA use a more flexible evidentiary process aiming to 
provide a fair and independent system. EUVIPA provides for detailed rules 
concerning mediation with a mandatory six-month cooling period before a 
claim can be submitted for arbitration. During which the parties consult, 
followed by mediation or conciliation. A party can submit a notice of 
arbitration only upon expiration of the cooling period.142 Article 14 provides 
for transparency.143 
 
China 
 
Illustrative provisions from China FTAs, such as in the China-New 
Zealand Agreement, are as follows.144   
Art 194.3 “The final report of the arbitral tribunal shall be made 
available as a public document after the lapse of 10 days from the date of its 
release.”  
Art.168 “Each Party shall ensure that its laws, regulations, procedures 
and administrative rulings of general application respecting any matter 
covered by this Agreement are promptly published or made available in such 
 
licences, permits, contracts or other rights in relation to an Investment. 2. Investors and their 
investments shall not be complicit in any act described in paragraph 1, including incitement, 
aiding and abetting, and conspiracy to commit or authorization of such acts.” NATHALIE 
BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER ET AL., HARNESSING INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 10 (2018) https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/meterial/harnessing-invest 
ment-sustainabledevelopment.pdf.  
 141. EU-Vietnam trade and investment agreements, Art. 15, Free Trade Agreement Text, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437. See also EU-Vietnam Free Trade 
Agreement: Joint Press Statement by Commissioner Malmström and Minister Tran Tuan Anh, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2041. See also Shilpa Singh J., Analyzing 
Features of Investment Court System under CETA and EUVIPA: Discussing Improvement in 
the System and Clarity to Clauses, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Feb. 8, 2019) http:// 
arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/02/08/analyzingfeatures-of-investment-court-sy 
stem-under-ceta-and-euvipa-discussing-improvement-in-the-system-and-clarity-toclauses/. 
 142. Singh, supra note 141.  
 143. Free Trade Agreement, EU-Viet., Art. 14, Sept. 24, 2018, http://trade.ec.europa. 
eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437. 
 144. Analysis from the following China FTAs: Free Trade Agreement, China-N.Z., 
Chapter 13, 2008, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agree 
ments-in-force/china-fta/nz-china-fta-resources. 
Free Trade Agreement, China-Austl., Chapter 13, 2015, https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agree 
ments/in-force/chafta/official-documents/Pages/official-documents.aspx. 
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a manner as to enable interested persons and the other Party to become 
acquainted with them.”  
Art. 170 “Each Party shall, where warranted, establish or maintain 
judicial, quasijudicial or administrative tribunals, or procedures for the 
purpose of the prompt review and correction of final administrative actions 
regarding matters covered by this Agreement, other than those taken for 
prudential reasons. Such tribunals shall be impartial and independent of the 
office or authority entrusted with administrative enforcement and shall not 
have any substantial interest in the outcome of the matter.”  
From the China-South Korea FTA.145  
Article 4.5: Transparency 1. Each Party shall ensure that its customs 
and other trade-related laws, regulations, general administrative procedures 
and other requirements, including fees and charges, are readily available to 
all interested parties, via an officially designated medium including official 
website. Each customs authority shall publish146 all customs laws and any 
administrative procedures it applies or enforces, via an officially designated 
medium including official website.   
In summary, both EU and China provide in their FTAs for publishing 
relevant laws and regulations. 
 
Other FTAs 
United States 
 
Illustrative provisions from U.S. FTAs, such as in the CAFTA-DR 
Agreement, are as follows.147 CAFTA-DR examples:   
 
 145. Free Trade Agreement, China-S. Kor., Art. 4.5, June 1, 2015, http://fta.mofcom.gov. 
cn/korea/annex/xdzw_en.pdf.   
 146. See also Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., Art. 20.14, July 14, 2004, https:// 
ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/australian-fta/final-text. (“The panel shall 
present a final report to the disputing Parties, including any separate opinions on matters not 
unanimously agreed, within 30 days of presentation of the initial report, unless the disputing 
Parties otherwise agree. The disputing Parties shall release the final report to the public within 
15 days thereafter, subject to the protection of confidential information.”). 
 147. Analysis from the following FTAs: Free Trade Agreement, CAFTA-DR, Chapter 18, 
2004, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-
central-america-fta/final-text. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., Chapter 20, 2004, https:// 
ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/australian-fta/final-text. See also Lance 
Compa, Jeffrey Vogt, and Eric Gottwald, Wrong Turn for Workers’ Rights: The U.S.-
Guatemala CAFTA Labor Arbitration Ruling – And What To Do About It, INTERNATIONAL 
LABOR RIGHTS FORUM (Apr. 12, 2018), https://laborrights.org/publications/wrong-turn-work 
ers%E2%80%99-rights-us-guatemala-cafta-labor-arbitration-ruling-%E2%80%93-and-wha 
t-do (discussing inherent issues and obstacles in enforcement).  
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Art 18.2 Publish laws, regulations, procedures, and administrative 
rulings of general application respecting any matter covered by the 
Agreement.  
Art 18.5 Maintain independent and impartial judicial, quasi-judicial, or 
administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose of the prompt review 
and, where warranted, correction of final administrative actions regarding 
matters covered by this Agreement.   
Anti-Corruption Measures: Art 18.8: 1. Each Party shall adopt or 
maintain the necessary legislative or other measures to establish that bribery 
is a criminal offense in matters affecting international trade or investment; 
and 2. Adopt or maintain appropriate penalties and procedures to enforce the 
criminal measures that it adopts.   
About the recently negotiated but not yet ratified USMCA FTA,148 it 
has been observed,149  
 
Chapter 27 of the USMCA’s anticorruption measures can be 
divided into three categories, namely: (1) legislative measures—
i.e., laws or other legislative measures to criminalize bribery; (2) 
administrative measures—i.e., measures that the countries may 
undertake through executive-branch regulation or similar action, 
rather than new legislation; and (3) promotional measures—i.e., 
measures that are less concrete and harder to quantify, but call for 
the three countries to promote and encourage awareness and the 
adoption of certain anticorruption practices while requiring no real 
specific action. Chapter 27 explicitly permits the parties to initiate 
claims through the USMCA’s dispute settlement mechanism to 
challenge measures alleged to be inconsistent with the Chapter’s 
requirements.  
 
CPTPP  
 
 
 148. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 2018, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/ 
free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreementbetween.  
 149. Collmann Griffin, Richard Mojica, & Marc Alain Bohn, Takeaways from the Anti-
Corruption Chapter of the USMCA, FCPA BLOG, (Jan. 9, 2019), http://www.fcpablog. 
com/blog/2019/1/9/takeaways-from-the-anti-corruption-chapter-of-the-usmca.html. (“To be 
sure, there are clear limitations on the applicability of the dispute settlement mechanism to 
Chapter 27’s anticorruption provisions. Most notably, the signatories have explicitly excluded 
disputes arising out of parties’ failure to effectively enforce laws adopted or maintained 
pursuant to the agreement, likely due to sovereignty concerns. In addition, because the 
USMCA is ultimately a trade agreement, the dispute resolution mechanism only covers 
measures that affect trade or investment between the parties.”).  
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The recent recently completed CPTPP FTA has illustrative 
provisions.150  
Art 26.2. Publish laws, regulations, procedures and administrative 
rulings of general application with respect to any matter covered by this 
Agreement : Art 26.7 Anti-Corruption measures should be maintained by 
legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal 
offences under its law, in matters that affect international trade or investment 
and make violators liable for sanctions.  
 
Enforcement Mechanisms 
 
China and the EU take a similar approach to the enforcement of the 
transparency provision in their FTAs. First off, claims under the 
transparency chapters can access the full dispute resolution options included 
in the agreement;151 this is unlike the labor and environmental chapters which 
have no access to binding arbitration in EU and China FTAs.152 If a binding 
arbitration is requested, the parties are responsible for implementing the 
arbitration decision, and there are penalties for failing to comply with the 
arbitration ruling.153 The EU and China slightly differ in the steps that must 
be taken before a party “suspended obligations” of the trade agreement on 
all or some of the other parties ’benefits. China requires parties to first 
negotiate on compensation to resolve the noncompliance before suspending 
obligations154, while the EU gives the parties the option to either negotiate 
compensation or suspend obligations.155 Similarly, the U.S. and CPTPP 
enables a party to “suspend benefits” if the other party fails to implement an 
 
 150. Analysis from the following: CPTPP, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement 
for Trans-Pacific Partnership, https://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/texttexte/index.aspx?lang=eng. Agreement Analysis 
by New Zealand, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/CPTPP/Comprehensive-and-Progressive-Agreement-forTra 
ns-Pacific-Partnership-CPTPP-National-Interest-Analysis.pdf.  
 151. Failure to comply with transparency requirements can go to binding arbitration 
pursuant to CETA, Article 29.10.  
 152. See Ronald C. Brown, FTAs in Asia-Pacific: ‘Next Generation’ of Social Dimension 
Provisions on Labor? 26 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 69 (2016) at 2. 
 153. See Free Trade Agreement, China-N.Z., Art. 195, 2008, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/ 
topic/ennewzealand.shtml. See also CETA, Can.-EU, Art, 29.12, 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/. 
 154. See Free Trade Agreement, China-N.Z., Art. 198, 2008, http://fta.mof com.gov.cn/ 
topic/ennewzealand.shtml.  
 155. See CETA, Can.-EU, Art, 29.14, 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ 
ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/. 
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arbitration ruling after attempting to negotiate compensation.156 These 
remedies are only available to Government Parties.   
Third-party investors have a different set of dispute resolution remedies 
that are governed by the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.157 All parties have 
ratified  the “Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards”158 and are obligated to enforce foreign arbitration 
 
 156. See Free Trade Agreement, CAFTA-DR, Art. 20.16, 2004, https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republiccentral-america-fta/final-text. 
See also Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, Art 28.20, 
2018, https://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/ag 
racc/cptpp-ptpgp/text-texte/index.aspx?lang=eng.  
 157. See Art 8.41 CETA and Art 153 China-New Zealand FTA. See generally Julissa 
Reynoso, Michael A. Fernández, Ariel Flint, & Erin Baldwin, The Corruption Defense: 
Practical Considerations for Claimants, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Jan. 22, 2019), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/01/22/the-corruption-defense-practical-co 
nsiderations-forclaimants/. See also Reeder, supra note 44. 
 158. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“The 
New York Convention”), June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3; available at https://www.uncitral. 
org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/New-York-Convention-E.pdf. See also Thomas G. 
Allen, Andrew Van Duzer, & Daniel E. Parga, China Aims to Modernize Its Arbitration and 
Award Enforcement Regime, GREENBERGTRAURIG (Sept. 2018), https://www.gtlaw.com/ 
en/insights/2018/9/china-aims-to-modernize-its-arbitration-and-award-enforcement-regime. 
(“China’s reputation for enforcing foreign arbitration awards remains mixed, and there are 
examples of the process taking many years,” but reforms of arbitration were announced on 
Sept. 7, 2018 by China’s Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in its five-
year legislative plan “to study and potentially move forward with revisions to China’s 
arbitration law (Arbitration Law) and the implementation of a new civil enforcement law.”). 
Part of the problem for foreign parties in the enforcement of arbitration agreements in China 
arises when a foreign party is registered in China as a WFOE, because the Chinese then 
consider it a Chinese party and resorts to domestic law, not foreign treaty law for the 
enforcement. For discussion on reforms seeking to further align Chinese arbitration with 
international practices, with “a signal to the international arbitration community about China’s 
commitment to evolve into an arbitration-friendly environment,” see Jingzhou Tao and 
Mariana Zhong, China’s 2017 Reform of Its Arbitration-Related Court Review Mechanism 
with a Focus on Improving Chinese Courts’ Prior-Reporting System, 35 J. OF INT’L ARB. Issue 
3, 371–378 (2018). Also, there are signs of liberalizing that definition in cases arising from a 
Chinese free trade zone, where a foreign party, even though a WFOE, may still be considered 
as a “foreign party. See also Tereza Gao and Edison Li, China Cases Insight No. 5: Through 
Siemens v. Golden Landmark, China Reforms Arbitration for Free Trade Zones in Order to 
Prepare for “Belt & Road”, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL CHINA GUIDING CASES PROJECT (June 
29, 2018), https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/commentaries/clc-1-201806insights-5-gao-li/ (“In 
January 2017, the SPC issued the Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Provision 
of Judicial Safeguards for the Construction of Pilot Free Trade Zones, (the “2017 Opinions”),  
Paragraph 9 of which provides: where wholly foreign-owned enterprises registered in pilot 
free trade zones mutually agree to submit a commercial dispute to arbitration outside the 
territory [of China], [a people’s court] should not determine that the related arbitration 
agreement is invalid merely on the grounds that the [enterprises’] dispute does not have 
foreign related elements.”).  
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awards.159 Additionally, third-party investors must have “clean hands,” to 
avoid corrupt investors using the dispute resolution mechanisms to evade 
liabilities.160 Many EU countries have in the past  
negotiated agreements which include a mechanism for resolving 
disputes between governments and investors known as investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS).161 CETA replaces this with a new and better Investment 
Court System (ICS). CETA contains an Investment Court,162 which has been 
confirmed to be compatible with EU treaties.163 
 
 159. See Mo Zhang, Enforceability: Foreign Arbitral Awards in Chinese Courts, 20 SAN 
DIEGO INT’L L.J. 1 (2018), https://digital.sandiego.edu/ilj/vol20/iss1/2/ (for information on 
enforcement of arbitration awards in China). 
 160. Article 8 of CETA stipulates if corruption affects an investment, access to investment 
court is precluded. Can.-EU Trade Agreement (CETA), Chapter 8, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/ 
policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/. See also Mbiyavanga, supra note 40. (“The 
usual setting within which investment arbitration is taking place is that of an investor bringing 
a claim against a host state, e.g. for compensation for loss of investment. By invoking the so-
called corruption defense, however, the table turns, and it is the host state bringing a 
counterclaim against the investor by invoking acts of corruption, e.g. bribery, as a means to 
preclude any claims an investor might make and evade every liability. The raison d’être of 
the corruption defense is that while arbitral tribunals are not tasked with punishing acts of 
corruption, they clearly ‘cannot grant assistance to a party that has engaged in a corrupt act.”) 
While Article 8.41(4) goes back to the home country for enforcement of the arbitration, since 
all parties have ratified UNCITRAL it is essential they comply regardless if it is country with 
a weak rule of law. Additionally, if a government party fails to comply with an investor then 
the other government party can step in and suspend benefits. See CETA, EU-Can., Art, 29.12, 
2017. See also provisions in the UNCITRAL model rules of arbitration addressing corrupt 
public procurement, https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/COSP/session2/V0 
850164e.pdf. 
 161. CETA Explained, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ 
ceta/ceta-explained/index_en.htm#read-more. 
 162. Investment provisions within Free Trade Agreement, EU-Can. (CETA), http://trade. 
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdf. (“CETA creates a permanent 
investment Tribunal and an Appellate Tribunal. Contrary to the traditional investment dispute 
settlement approach, the Tribunal will be composed of fifteen members nominated by the 
Union and Canada and not by arbitrators nominated by the investor and the defending state. 
The tribunal will hear cases in divisions of three members appointed via a randomized 
procedure. The Appellate Tribunal will review decisions of the Tribunal. CETA clearly 
defines the grounds for reviewing awards of the Tribunal. The Members of the Tribunal and 
Appellate Tribunal will have the same qualifications as for the International Court of Justice 
and will have to be beyond reproach in terms of ethics. The Union and Canada will adopt a 
decision setting out the practical details, already identified in CETA. In addition, CETA 
contains a firm commitment that the Union and Canada will join efforts with other interested 
parties for the creation of an international multilateral investment court.”).  
 163. Guillaume Croisant, Opinion 1/17 – The CJEU Confirms that CETA’s Investment 
Court System is Compatible with EU Law, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Apr. 30, 2019), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/04/30/opinion-117the-cjeu-confirms-that-
cetas-investment-court-system-is-compatible-with-eu-law/. (“The Court of Justice of the 
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IV. Analysis 
The Problem  
 
[R]esearchers have found evidence for negative effects of 
corruption on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the hypothesis 
that corruption deters foreign investment by acting as an extra 
tax.164   
 
Transparency International’s new report, Exporting 
Corruption, finds that only 11 major exporting countries—
accounting for about a third of world exports—have active or 
moderate law enforcement against companies bribing abroad in 
order to gain mining rights, contracts for major construction 
projects, purchases of planes and other deals.165  
China, as one of the world’s largest exporters and foreign direct 
investors, especially under its BRI global economic development plan is 
identified as a state failing to enforce anticorruption and transparency 
standards.166 Likewise, EU states ’enforcement of anticorruption laws is not 
consistent among themselves.167  
To date, the current approach of international and national monitoring 
mechanisms, laws, and sanctions used as enforcement means are largely 
ineffective to end corruption in trade. Likewise, relying on peer-review 
evaluations that lack meaningful sanctions mechanism does not appear to be 
 
European Union (“CJEU”) confirmed the compatibility with EU law of the Investment Court 
System (“ICS”) provided for by the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between 
the EU and Canada (“CETA”).”).  
 164. Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella, The New Economics of Corruption: A Survey and 
Some New Results, 45 POLITICAL STUDIES 496 (1997), http://www.people.hbs.edu/rditella/ 
papers/pscorrsurvey.pdf, cited in, Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1. 
 165. Foreign Bribery Rages Unchecked in Over Half of Global Trade, TRANSPARENCY 
INTERNATIONAL (2018) https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/exporting-corruption-
2018. Country by country, the report names the top offenders as well as the flaws in national 
legal systems that allow these crimes to continue unchecked.  
 166. Dell, supra note 58. 
 167. Anti-Corruption Report, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/ 
what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report. 
(“The report showed that the nature and scope of corruption varies from one Member State to 
another and that the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies is quite different. It also showed 
how corruption is a phenomenon affecting all Member States, and how continued action is 
needed across the EU.”). 
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ending corruption. The European Commission too has seldom exercised 
sanctions for corruption against member states.168   
Regional trade agreements are enforced through both bilateral investor-
state dispute settlements and bilateral Government-government dispute 
settlements. What happens, however, if a country lacks the proper 
institutions for the desired implementation of remedies for violations; for 
instance, judicial independence and rule of law generally? It is argued that 
“newly included references to anticorruption conventions are good news 
only as far as the simple ratification of those conventions goes, for such 
conventions can have almost no effect, particularly in countries with high 
corruption.”169  
 
Alternative Approaches  
 
How to curb corruption in international trade and investment is 
certainly as formidable a task as religion’s efforts to eliminate sin. Scholars 
of the highest order have identified, explained, and proposed many 
approaches to end it, but the fight goes on to harness the most effective 
solutions.170 Professor Mungiu-Pippidi laid out the challenge: “What 
synergies could be developed across the board to enhance the impact across 
trade and anticorruption policies? How have the international conventions 
and the anticorruption legal regime performed so far, and what kind of 
provisions in the international trade agreement could help them, or be helped 
by them?”171  
Within the perimeters of this paper, focused on EU and China FTA 
provisions, what practical alternatives can be proposed for their mutual 
benefit with the goal of fighting corruption? Some basic observations are 
identified below:  
International bribery and corruption are endemic. International 
standards and conventions produce inconsistent prosecution results at the 
state level. While the EU and its Members have had successes in prosecuting 
corruption under state law, enforcement is still inconsistent across the entire 
EU.172 China is negatively perceived on its role in corruption in international 
 
 168. See Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1, at 26. A monitoring mechanism with collective 
sanctions is included in the EU’s ‘trade for all’ strategy, but it was never implemented in the 
Cotonou agreement (the only one country has ever been sanctioned).  
 169. Id. at 25.  
 170. See e.g., Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Seven Steps to Control of Corruption: The Road 
Map, (2018) https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/daed_a_00500.  
 171. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1, at 27. 
 172. Id. at 35. (“Today, the uneven implementation of the OECD antibribery convention 
even across EU members, let alone the rest of the world raises the question of whether 
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trade and investment and there is a paucity of evidence of successful 
prosecutions under its laws.173  
Therefore, what more can be done to effectively diminish the global 
plague of corruption? Standards, conventions, laws, trade agreements all 
appear to have their shortcomings. Is there an approach that can provide 
enhanced enforcement and an umbrella of protection to all states and citizens 
under it?  
Recommended approaches in fighting corruption in international trade 
have been suggested.174  
Foremost is the necessity for a rule of law to exist in the country that 
would prosecute the case.175 Without laws and their administrative and 
judicial enforcement there is only an inert law. As mentioned, China has a 
negative rating on endemic corruption, at least partly due to rule of law  
 
emphasis on laws against bribery which cannot be enforced equally across parties actually 
brings more equal treatment and market access, or less. In fact, uneven enforcement of laws 
prohibiting foreign bribery puts companies that play by the rules while competing in a global 
marketplace at a serious disadvantage.”). 
 173. Jonathan E. Hillman, Corruption Flows Along China’s Belt and Road, CENTER FOR 
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.csis.org/analysis/corru 
ptionflows-along-chinas-belt-and-road (for example, comments include the following: “In 
many of the 80-plus countries that the BRI aims to connect, corruption is endemic. … China 
adopted a foreign bribery law in 2011 but has done little to enforce it. Chinese companies are 
also among the least transparent according to a Transparency International study of 100 
companies in 15 emerging markets.”). 
 174. See e.g., Dell & McDevitt, supra note 50. See also Dell, supra note 58. See also 
Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1. Some argue that “[to] date, the most effective enforcement 
mechanism we have seen in an anti-corruption treaty is the peer-review monitoring system 
overseen by the OECD Working Group on Bribery,” the fact is China is not a member of the 
OECD. Where: Global reach, OECD.ORG, https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-
partners/. For comments on the proposed terms for the USMCA, see Griffin, Mojica, & Bohn, 
supra note 149. (“Although there are no penalties as a result of these periodic peer-review 
assessments, the Working Group has proven to be a surprisingly powerful motivator for 
OECD members, appearing to drive legislative and administrative reform among countries 
simply through “naming and shaming.” Whether the USMCA dispute settlement will prove 
as effective as the OECD Working Group will be an important anti-corruption development 
to watch.”).  
 175. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1 (noting that there is a “close correlation between the 
rule of law and control of corruption (at over 90 per cent in World Governance Indicators) so 
clearly, wherever corruption is high the rule of law is also inadequate. How then can legal 
approaches to anti-corruption be expected to work, or can the solution be the same as the 
problem itself? Furthermore, change in control of corruption in countries with an anti-
corruption agency (ACA) but lacking the rule of law is on average marginally lower than in 
those which introduced an ACA and attained a certain level of the rule of law. The reasons 
are obvious, for regardless of how much emphasis the UNCAC and the international 
anticorruption community place on ‘autonomous’ anticorruption agencies, they can hardly be 
divorced from the context of the country.”).   
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issues and lack of openness.176 Likewise, enforcement agencies, need 
authority and the availability of the rule of law to enforce. Beyond that, over 
the years, at the national level the following suggestions have been offered 
for inclusion in FTA provisions seeking to limit corruption.  
Establish open markets177  
Have strong national laws  
Develop the proper institutions to implement the law  
Encourage due diligence by having it affect remedy. This can bring 
prevention and avoidance of corporate liability and penalties; and of course, 
save huge amounts of defense costs.178  
Include whistleblower protections  
Monitor foreign bribery settlements  
Debar violators from state benefits and government-backed financing179  
 
 176. Hillman, supra note 173 (“A long list of Chinese companies has been debarred from 
the World Bank and other multilateral development banks for fraud and corruption, which 
covers everything from inflating costs to giving bribes. In many of the 80-plus countries that 
the BRI aims to connect, corruption is endemic. Among participating economies, the median 
credit rating is junk, so alternative lenders stay away. Chinese construction companies benefit 
because—backed by state financing and often state ownership—they are willing to take risks 
that others will not. They also know that, if the going gets tough, Beijing can intervene 
politically on their behalf. Of course, Chinese companies are not alone in being accused of 
peddling influence. But authorities in the United States and European Union are more vigilant 
in policing their own companies abroad. China adopted a foreign bribery law in 2011 but has 
done little to enforce it. Chinese companies are also among the least transparent according to 
a Transparency International study of 100 companies in 15 emerging markets.”). 
 177. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1, at 35 (“Establish as the main goal a trade treaty to 
open markets. The evidence speaks for itself that the more a market is opened, the greater the 
contribution to countering corruption, even if only in the long run. … [A] treaty which opens 
nearly all public procurement areas to external competition and makes it entirely transparent 
makes a far larger contribution than one which invokes criminal penalties which it cannot 
enforce.”).   
 178. Jenkins, Chu, & Meadors, supra note 59. Due diligence can save companies much 
money in lowered penalties. For example, it is reported, “Morgan Stanley because it had an 
effective compliance program in place, conducted a thorough investigation when the matter 
was discovered and fully cooperated with authorities. Morgan Stanley, because of its 
proactive practices, has saved many millions of dollars in investigation costs, legal fees, and 
potential fines and disgorgements. (In contrast, Wal-Mart disclosed that its FCPA 
investigation costs had reached $230 million as of March of 2013, equating to approximately 
$600,000 per day in professional fees, and continues to grow. The U.S. government hasn’t 
yet assessed Wal-Mart penalties or fees.).”   
 179. Hillman, supra note 173 (“Certain experts argue that trade agreements should include 
as standard provisions stipulating that countries may debar firms found guilty of corruption 
from competing for public contracts in either the home or host country. That is the model as 
practiced by the World Bank, for instance and found in  treaties, for instance in the final 
[CP]TPP text, which stated that countries ‘may include’ procedures which would render 
ineligible for future contracts suppliers that have engaged in fraud.”). MungiuPippidi, supra 
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Limit the use of corrupt party’s use of FTA dispute resolution 
procedures180  
Name and shame violators181  
Require whistleblower provisions182  
Make public, international organizations and state evaluations and 
decisions regarding corruption, to the extent permissible by law183  
States could work with and utilize the resources of FCPA, as was done 
with France”184  
 
note 1, at 23 (“By analogy, a long list of Chinese companies has been debarred from the World 
Bank and other multilateral development banks for fraud and corruption, which covers 
everything from inflating costs to giving bribes.”).  
 180. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra  note 1, at 36 (“Disbarment of firms should be considered 
when countries have no anti-bribery laws or do not implement them.”).  
 181. This approach is used by the OECD. 
 182. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1, at 23-24, 36. A US trade deal with Korea incorporated 
mandatory whistleblower protection measures, while other recent US trade agreements with 
Colombia, with Peru and with Panama have introduced measures providing for non-criminal 
sanctions for enterprises not subject to criminal penalties. 
 183. Id. (“GRECO and OECD evaluation reports are public by default, with UNCAC 
reports available only case-by-case. The US now includes in all its trade agreements, GPA 
equivalent measures such as a provision to ensure integrity in government procurement 
practices. A US trade deal with Korea incorporated mandatory whistleblower protection 
measures, while other recent US trade agreements with Colombia, with Peru and with Panama 
have introduced measures providing for non-criminal sanctions for enterprises not subject to 
criminal penalties.”). 
 184. Id. at 25. (“[T]he FPCA can be a formidable instrument and the recent practice of 
seeking claims on behalf of other countries promises more cooperation in future.”). See also 
2013 Mid-Year FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN (July 8, 2013), https://www.gibsondunn.com/ 
2013-mid-year-fcpa-update/. (“On May 29, 2013, DOJ and the SEC announced a joint FCPA 
settlement with French oil and gas company Total, S.A.  In one of the largest combined 
monetary resolutions in the statute’s history, Total, an ADR-issuer in the United States, agreed 
to pay a $245.2 million fine to DOJ and to disgorge $153 million in profits to the SEC, for a 
total payment of more than $398 million. Simultaneously, French anti-corruption authorities 
announced that they are recommending that Total, a senior executive, and two Iranian 
businessmen stand trial on related charges before a Paris criminal tribunal. DOJ’s press 
release announcing the settlement that this case represents “the first coordinated action by 
French and U.S. law enforcement in a major foreign bribery case” and evidences that the two 
countries “are working more closely today than ever before to combat corporate corruption.”  
But the DPA itself reveals some of the challenges of French-U.S. law enforcement 
coordination, qualifying what is usually a boilerplate obligation to cooperate with U.S. 
authorities’ post-settlement with notations that any such cooperation must be consistent with 
French data protection, labor, and blocking statutes. … Total is contesting the French charges, 
releasing a statement that “Total and [the senior executive] will argue that the behavior that 
they are accused of was completely legal under French law. According to the U.S. settlements, 
between 1995 and 2004, Total utilized intermediaries to make approximately $60 million in 
improper payments to the Chairman of a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil 
Company to obtain the rights to develop two significant oil and gas fields in Iran. Total 
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On the international level, a variety of approaches can be considered.  
Create a new international prosecution body. The OECD Convention 
Against Corruption or UNCAC or GRECO could be expanded providing 
resort to a newly created international body that would prosecute individual 
cases after monitoring reveals an absence of national competency as 
measured by Convention criteria. But will China be included? 
Insert in the EU-China FTA a provision for agreement to the application 
of a strong EU anticorruption enforcement law, such as that in the UK, and 
similar to the practice of the U.S. to insert the FCPA.185  
Having openness is perhaps the best and easiest approach to 
diminishing corruption, not just in the procurement process, but in all the 
government transactions, prosecutions for corruption, and contents of 
corruption settlements and decisions. One way to do this is through 
provisions in free trade agreements, bilateral or multilateral. In the case of 
an EU-China FTA, the umbrella of the agreement would affect 29 countries. 
 
V. Conclusion: Path for Enhanced Enforcement and  
Umbrella Coverage of Anticorruption 
 
An EU-China FTA can be a win-win proposition for each in that the 
anticorruption provisions can bring a harmonization186 of obligations within 
and between 29 states (EU’s 28 Members and China) regardless of the status 
of their local laws; and, at the same time, given the proper dispute resolution 
procedures, provide an alternative resolution through international 
arbitration.187 For China, the win is to gain an international forum for 
 
allegedly mischaracterized the unlawful payments as “business development expenses” paid 
through what purported to be legitimate consulting agreements with the intermediaries.”)  
 185. All U.S. FTAs may be found at the U.S. Trade Representative Website: http://www. 
ustr.gov/trade-agreements/freetrade-agreements. 
 186. Griffin, Mojica, & Bohn, supra note 149. (Commenting on the proposed USMCA: 
“Use Chapter 27 to help streamline compliance programs—If the USMCA goes into force, 
the United States, Mexico, and Canada will be obliged to harmonize any domestic anti-
corruption laws and practices that are out of step with the agreement. This harmonization 
should ideally help to establish a more uniform set of expectations from prosecutors and 
regulators in the United States, Mexico, and Canada, allowing companies to streamline 
policies and procedures that previously had to be tailored based on jurisdiction. In anticipation 
of this harmonization, companies and compliance professionals in the region can use Chapter 
27 to begin streamlining their compliance programs in each of these countries to meet the 
anti-corruption standards set forth in the USMCA.”).  
 187. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1, at 25. (“Many trade agreements like … the EU-
Canada CETA offer foreign traders and investors certain protections similar to those provided 
by bilateral investment treaties. They allow investors to seek restitution outside the host state’s 
judicial system, where that state has not complied with its treaty obligations subject to the 
government-government dispute settlement (GGDS) mechanism. Transparency International 
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resolving issues of corruption in international trade.188 However, if the 
dispute resolution procedures are not crafted to largely avoid local 
institutions and domestic rule of law issues (especially on enforcement), 
FTA anticorruption, openness and good governance provisions will not 
necessarily be effective. Some of these alternatives to strengthen the dispute 
resolution provisions, which are the key to successful enforcement, 
discussed above could be considered and incorporated in the FTA.189 
The pathway to an EU-China FTA that has the potential to add an 
additional legal tool for addressing the endemic plague of bribery and 
corruption in international trade includes three steps.190 
First, provide substantive transparency and anticorruption provisions in 
the FTA. 
Secondly, provide a broad procedural pathway to dispute resolution and 
binding arbitration, anticipating rule of law enforcement issues in some 
states.  
Thirdly, authorize the dispute arbitrators with a panoply of remedies, 
including to bar claimants use of the procedures if in their relevant 
transactions they have engaged in corruption and bribery.191 
 
 
 
 
(2017) highlights the necessity to implement RTAs at national level. A problem in local 
enforcement could arise.”). 
 188. Note that China is not a member of the OECD or a signatory of its Anti-Corruption 
Convention. 
 189. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1, at 25. See also Westbroek, supra note 82, at 3.  
 190. Analysis from the following China FTAs: Free Trade Agreement, China-N.Z., 
Chapter 13, 2008,  http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/ennewzealand.shtml; Free Trade 
Agreement, China-S. Kor., June 1, 2015, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/korea/annex/xdzw_en.pdf.  
One can look to the EU’s CETA provisions and China’s provisions in its New Zealand or 
South Korean FTAs. Also useful are the provisions in the CPTPP and the USMCA. Mungiu-
Pippidi, supra note 1, at 25. (“Regional trade agreements are enforced through both bilateral 
Investor-state dispute settlements and bilateral Government-government dispute settlements. 
Many trade agreements like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), TPP and 
the EU-Canada CETA offer foreign traders and investors certain protections similar to those 
provided by bilateral investment treaties. They allow investors to seek restitution outside the 
host state’s judicial system, where that state has not complied with its treaty obligations 
subject to the government-government dispute settlement (GGDS) mechanism. Transparency 
International (2017) highlights the necessity to implement RTAs at national level.”)  
 191. Foreign Bribery Rages Unchecked in Over Half of Global Trade, supra note 165. 
(“A long list of Chinese companies has been debarred from the World Bank and other 
multilateral development banks for fraud and corruption, which covers everything from 
inflating costs to giving bribes.”). 
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